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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

THE COMMERCE CLAUSE IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION AND IN CONTEMPORARY COMMENT
By

ALBERT

S.

ABEL*

T

HIS paper constitutes one instalment of an examination into
the historical meaning of the commerce clause of the American constitution. Specifically it seeks by a comprehensive and
detailed sifting of the materials from the years 1787 and 1788 to
discover what import was originally attributed to the clause by
contemporaries actively engaged in the processes of formulation
or ratification. There is no intention to suggest that current commerce clause construction, in so far as it may depart from that
initially indicated, is to be condemned on that account. In the
evaluation of constitutional doctrine, there are other and more
important factors to be considered than the "intention of the
framers." Yet the latter has its own interest, both intrinsically
and as a means of appraising accurately the validity or spuriousness of the claims to the support of that revered authority, which
are so often used as substitutes for argument. The writer of
this paper is interested only in making it clear what that intention
was, so far as regards the commerce clause; the reader is free
to draw whatever conclusions he pleases therefrom, or none at
all if that suits him better.
THE SCOPE AND CONTENT OF THE GRANTED POWER
RUNNING

THE BOUNDARY

BETWEEN STATE AND NATIONAL

It seems to have been common ground
that the general government as constituted-or reconstituted-by
the convention was to possess a power of regulating commerce.
It was by no means so universally agreed that there should be a
clause granting to it the power "to regulate commerce." That
depended on the larger preliminary question of the place of Congress and of the general government in the revised political system.
Were the states to be reduced substantially to the position of
municipal corporations confined to the area of local self-government, and Congress invested with a general legislative power
which would require little or nothing in the way of specification?
*Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
AUTHORITY GENERALLY.
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Or were the states to be constituent members of a federal system,
with an extension of the powers of the general government into
enumerated fields (including the field of commercial regulation),
not theretofore within its range of action?
Hamilton from New York and Randolph from Virginia prepared plans which looked toward the former and more radical
alteration in the existing arrangement. Paterson from New Jersey
and Pinckney from South Carolina presented tentative first drafts
for a constitution based on a mere re-distribution of existing
powers, enlarging and implementing the federal authority but retaining the federal principle.
The Hamilton plan, which was decidedly the most sweeping
of all (but which was perhaps never really presented for consideration) provided that "the Legislature of the United States
shall have power to pass all laws which they shall judge necessary
to the common defence and general welfare of the Union," taking
effect, however, only upon and after assent by the president.' The
Randolph plan, a joint production, apparently, of the Virginia
delegation, in the authorship of which Madison may have had a
considerable hand,2 was less summary and rather less inclusive.
It declared
"that the national legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy the
legislative rights vested in Congress by the confederation and
moreover to legislate in all cases to which the separate states are
incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may
be interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation; to negative all laws passed by the several states contravening in the
opinion of the national legislature the articles of Union; and to
call forth the force of the Union agst. any member of the Union
failing to fulfill its duty under the articles thereof." 3
Indeed on its face this provision is not inconsistent with the
retention of a considerable independent jurisdiction by th6 states,
comparable to that marked out for the Canadian provinces by the
13 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (1911)
627. This work is a substantially definitive compilation of the materials
respecting the proceedings in the constitutional convention, consisting in
the main of the journal of the convention, and the notes of Madison,
McHenry, King, and other delegates, made contemporaneously, with a few
miscellaneous writings attributable to various delegates. It will hereafter
be cited as Farrand, with the addition parenthetically of the source of the
particular passage to which reference is made; thus, Farrand (Madison),
Farrand (Journal), etc.
2
See McLaughlin, A Constitutional History of the United States
(1935) 152.
31 Farrand (Madison) 21.
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disallowance clause 4 and the residuary clause of section 911 of the
British North America Act.
The particularity of the other two plans submitted stood in
marked contrast. The text of the Pinckney plan has been lost, but,
as conjecturally restored, it provided with regard to commerce
(disregarding its similarly specific grants of power as to other
matters) that Congress should have "the exclusive power, of
regulating the trade of the several states as well with foreign nations as with each other-of levying duties upon imports and
exports," saving to each state, however, the right to impose embargoes "in time of scarcity." 6 The Paterson plan represented
much the most detailed attempt to define the powers to be given
Congress, prescribing, with reference to commerce,
"that the United States in Congress be also authorized to pass
acts for the regulation of trade as well with foreign nations as
with each other, and for laying such prohibitions, and such imposts and duties upon imports as may be necessary for the purpose; provided, that the legislatures of the several states shall
not be restrained from laying embargoes in time of scarcity; and
provided further that such imports and duties so far forth as the
same shall exceed
per centum ad valorem in the imports shall7
accrue to the use of the state in which the same shall be collected."
A variant of this plan, somewhat simplifying its provisions and
linking them more clearly with the revenue system,8 was prepared
by Sherman of the Connecticut delegation, with whom Paterson
4

Section 90: "The following provisions of this Act respecting the

Parliament of Canada, namely,--the provisions relating to . . . the dis-

allowance of acts, and the signification of pleasure on bills reserved--shall
extend and apply to the legislatures of the several provinces as if those
provisions were here re-enacted and made applicable in terms to the respective provinces and the legislatures thereof, with the substitution of the
lieutenant-governor of the province for the governor-general, the governor
general for the Queen and for a secretary of state, . . . and of the province
for Canada."
5
Section 91: "It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the
advice of the Senate and House of Commons, to make laws for the peace,
order, and good government of Canada, in relation to all matters not
coming within the classes of subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to
the legislatures of the provinces. . .

."

For a good critical summary of

the design and scope of this clause, see Kennedy, The Judicial Process and
Canadian Legislative Powers, (1940) 25 Wash. Univ. L. Q.
63 Farrand 607.

Farrand 612.
83 Farrand 615 ("That in addition to the legislative powers vested in
Congress by the articles of confederation, the legislature of the United
States be authorized to make laws to regulate the commerce of the United
States with foreign nations, and among the several states in the union; to
impose duties on foreign goods and commodities imported into the United
States and on papers passing through the post office for raising a revenue,
and to regulate the collection thereof....")
73
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and his Jerseymen worked intimately during the early stages of
the convention; as was also a modification of the Randolph
proposals."
While our immediate concern is only with the genesis of the
commerce power, the matter of commercial regulation was to the
delegates a mere detail of application in comparison with two much
larger questions: what scope of action should be bestowed upon
the contemplated central government? And how far and in what
manner should the states' powers be curtailed? For perhaps the
majority of the members, the answers were furnished not by
maxims of political philosophy but by what appeared to be the
interests of the particular states which they were representing.
All during this preliminary consideration, the issue between the
large states and the small states over whether representation
should be by population or by states was coming to a head. 10
While we unfortunately lack any record of the dickerings, sideremarks, dinner table conversations, and tavern talks which must
have been going on feverishly, it would be only natural that the
large states should wish the most extended powers for the nation
and the most restricted zone of state action when it looked as if
population was to be the basis for representation and thus for
control; and that their enthusiasm should take the opposite turn
when the concession of equal representation of states in the
Senate had diminished that potentiality of control. And this is
precisely what the record shows. Thus, Randolph is found, after
the July recess from which the compromise of equal representation
in the Senate emerged, opposing a definition of federal legislative
powers based upon. and not substantially differing in language
from the provisions in the plan which he had sponsored. 1 Gouver013Farrand 616 ("To make laws binding on the people of the United
States, and on the courts of law, and other magistrates and officers civil
and military, within the several states, in all cases which concern the
common interests of the United States; but not to interfere with the
government of the individual states, in matters of internal police which
respect the government of such states only, and wherein the general welfare of the United States is not affected.")
"oSee McLaughlin, Constitutional History of the United States (1935)
chapter XIV, especially at pp. 162, 163.
"See 2 Farrand (Madison) 26, 27. It was agreed by both Randolph
and Bedford that the new matter added by the latter in moving the
amended resolution made no change of substance, the former characterizing it as "superfluous being included in the first," the latter arguing in its
support that "it is not more extensive or formidable than the clause as it
stands." Randolph had been quite explicit in his remarks on the preceding day, July 16, on the significant effect of the decision as to representation, see 2 id. (Madison) 17 ("Mr. Randolph. The vote of this morning
(involving an equality of suffrage in the second branch) had embarrassed
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neur Morris, who had shown a cheerful readiness to obliterate
the states,'" becomes wary of allowing the central government a
veto over state legislation.' 3 Conversely, Bedford of Delaware,
who had been outspoken in behalf of the claims of the smaller
states,'4 is seen moving the adoption of the Randolph-plan grant
of congressional authority,15 which its author disowned.
This dependence of constitutional doctrine upon practical politics, so patently present yet so obscurely traceable in particulars,
renders necessary the utmost caution, in the consideration of utterances on the basic general problems of the proposed scope of
enlargement of federal authority and diminution of state powers.
Yet, unsatisfactory as the materials are, they must be at least
cursorily examined as a basis for any genuine understanding of
what was effected by the grant of power over commerce. When
it came, it was but one of a group of powers bestowed on Congress. Its content and operation cannot legitimately be appraised
without an examination of the class characteristics of the powers
designed to be granted; and, as the convention itself did, we must
settle the meaning of the co-ordinated whole before we can fruitfully turn to the particular power.
On May 29, 1787, the convention really commenced its work.
The plan of the Virginians was presented by Randolph, and then
Pinckney introduced his. In the interest of informality and flexibility, the convention acted principally in committee of the whole,
in its early stages. As such, it proceeded to take up first 8 the
Randolph proposals severally, for the purpose of determining
which of them to put on its tentative agenda for more formal consideration and definite disposition thereafter. On May 31, it
reached that part of the proposal having to do with the legislative
the business extremely. All the powers given in the report from the
Come. of the whole, were founded on the supposition that a proportional
representation was to prevail in both branches of the legislature--WVhen he
came here this morning his purpose was to have offered some propositions
that might if possible have united a great majority of votes, and particularly might provide against the danger suspected on the part of the
smaller states. ...")

121 Farrand (Paterson) 556 (G. Morris-"We must have it in view
eventually to lessen and destroy the state limits and authorities.")
' 3See 2 Farrand (Madison) 28.
141 Farrand (Madison) 167; id. (King) 172.
152 Farrand (Madison) 26, 27.
' 6 There is no record that the Pinckney proposals ever were formally
considered by the committee of the whole; apparently, the assent to the
Randolph plan as a basis of discussion was felt, by reason of the different
basis on which the two proceeded, to have disposed of the former, which
were dropped by common consent or perhaps refined into the Paterson plan.
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powers to be given Congress. The concession of the powers
exercised under the articles of confederation (which, in the main,
have no significant connection with the commerce power) provoked no opposition. The provisions with reference to the negativing of state statutes (consideration of which may more appropriately be postponed at this point) were not reached until June 8.
There remained the power to legislate "in all cases to which the
separate states are incompetent" or "in which the harmony of the
united states may be interrupted by the exercise of individual
legislation." The committee voted to include both of these as a
basis for future action,' 7 the former after considerable discussion
by affirmative vote of nine states, with one, Connecticut, divided,
and none opposed,18 the latter without discussion or dissent"9
The proposals remained in this identical form on June 13, when
the convention completed its preliminary item-by-item consideration of the Randolph plan and reduced the results of its labors to
a tentative draft, for elaboration into a constitution.2" Two days
later, Paterson presented the plan bearing his name, 2' which the
New Jersey delegates, in connection with some others from the
smaller states, had been worldng out as a suggested alternative to
the Virginia-inspired system. The next week was occupied with
extensive discussion and final rejection of the New Jersey plan,
the convention adhering to that of Randolph as the foundation
for further action. On July 16, the section of the report from the
committee of the whole having to do with legislative powers was
reached for action by the convention as such, the immediate issue
being that of reference of its provisions to the committee of
detail.2 2 An effort the next day, by Sherman of Connecticut, to
substitute, for the phraseology quoted,23 a provision empowering
Congress to
"make laws binding on the people of the United States in all cases
which may concern the common interests of the Union; but not to
interfere with the government of the individual states in any
matters of internal police which respect the government of such
states only, and wherein the general welfare of the United States
is not concerned"
'71 Farrand (Journal) 47.
181 Farrand (Madison) 53, 54.
191 Farrand (Madison) 54.
201 Farrand (Journal) 225; id. (Madison) 236.

Farrand (Madison) 243.
Farrand (Madison) 17.
23Supra, text and note 17.
21

222
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was defeated by a vote of eight states to two.2 4 By a like vote, the

convention referred to the committee of detail a provision, submitted by Bedford, granting Congress power of legislation "in all
cases for the general interests of the Union, and also in those to
which the states are separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of
individual legislation."'25' Thus the delegates had twice approved,
once as a committee of the whole and once as a convention, schemes
which spoke in terms of legislative incompetence of the states, of
disturbances of harmony between the states, and-on the final submission-of furtherance of the general interests of the union.
They had rejected, once tacitly, in ignoring the Pinckney plan,
and again expressly, in their disposition of the Paterson proposals,
naked grants of enumerated powers unaccompanied by a declaration of standards appropriate for the determination of their scope
and reach, as well as Sherman's proposed amendment spot-lighting
the retained jurisdiction of the states. The action taken seems
significant, especially since (as will appear later) the report of the
committee on detail, and ultimately the constitution, did specify a
number of the individual powers-and, of particular interest to us,
the commerce power-which were contained in the rejected plans.
That significance is demonstrated when a consideration of the
discussions and expressions of opinion concerning the action
taken is added to the naked record of the proceedings themselves.
The want of precision in the expression, "cases to which the
separate states are incompetent," troubled a number of the delegates at the very outset. Pinckney and Rutledge called attention
to its vagueness and expressed doubt as to how to vote "until they
should see an exact enumeration of the powers comprehended by
this definition"; Butler "called on Mr. Randolp [sic] for the
extent of his meaning ;' 26 Sherman felt that the provision was too
indefinitely expressed, but recognized the difficulty involved in
undertaking "to define all the powers by detail." 27 These charges
of indefiniteness were not denied, as indeed they hardly could be.
Wilson took the ground that it was impossible to enumerate the
This
242 Farrand (Madison) 25, 26; see 2 Farrand (Journal) 21.
was in substance a re-presentation of the Connecticut contribution to the
rejected Paterson plan, quoted supra n. 9.
252 Farrand (Madison) 26. The italics (supplied) indicate the respect
in which the language in the reconstituted Bedford proposal was an amendment of and addition to that in the original Randolph plan.
261 Farrand (Madison) 53.
271 Farrand (Pierce) 60.
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powers appropriate for the federal government. 2 8 Madison tended
to the same position, stating that
"he had brought with him into the convention a strong bias in
favor of an enumeration and definition of the powers necessary
to be exercised by the national legislature; but had also brought
doubts concerning its practicability. His wishes remained unaltered; but his doubts had become stronger. What his opinion
might ultimately be he could not yet tell."2 9
This implied that the terms tentatively under consideration
were, or might be, substantially those designed to be incorporated
in the constitution. Randolph himself did not think of them in
that way; he envisaged his plan less as a rough draft of the constitution than as the outline within which a constitution should
be elaborated. "Details made no part of the plan and could not
perhaps with propriety have been introduced;"3 and he "disclaimed any intention to give indefinite powers to the national
legislature," 311 and limited his opposition to the request for specification to stating his view that it was impossible "just at this
time.".3 2 This approach was echoed by several of his colleagues,
who expressed the sentiment that the important thing immediately
to be done was to establish general principles as a point of departure for subsequent detailed action; there would be time enough
later to work out the particulars within the frame of reference
provided by the more general provisions.2 3 Against the background
of this discussion, and in the light of these explanations, the committee of the whole placed the resolutions concerning legislative
power in the agenda, for consideration by the convention proper.
There was a repetition of this whole discussion in rather
briefer form when, in due course, the convention reached this part
of the committee's proposals. Butler reiterated his objection as to
vagueness; Gorham replied, "The vagueness of the terms constitutes the propriety of them. We are now establishing general
-sl Farrand (Pierce) 60.
Farrand (Madison) 53.
301 Farrand (M adison) 51.
z11 Farrand (Madison) 53.
31 Farrand (Pierce) 60.
331 Farrand (Pierce) 60. The following extract shows the attitude
taken: "Mr. Madison said it was necessary to adopt some general principles on which we should act-that we were wandering from one thing to
another without seeming to be settled in any one principle. Mr. Wythe
observed that it would be right to establish general principles before we
go into detail, or very shortly gentlemen would find themselves in confusion, and would be obliged to have recurrence to the point from whence
they set out. Mr. King was of opinion that the principles ought first to be
established before we proceed to the framing of the act .. "
251
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principles, to be extended hereafter into details which will be
precise and explicit ;" and then the matter came definitely to a
head with a motion, by Rutledge, that the clause be committed
for a specification of the powers comprised in the general terms,
which was defeated by an equal division of the vote.34
The sense of the convention seems clear enough. The evident
purpose was to give power over neither a congeries of independent
unrelated subjects, nor yet over some misty and uncertain area
of undefined extent, but over a class of subjects, whose members
remained to be specified but which possessed the common characteristics referred to in the resolution as it went to the committee
of detail: that is to say, where the general interests of the union
were concerned, where the individual states lacked the capacity for
effective action, or where state legislation constituted an appreciable interference with the conditions making for good relations
between the several states. A standard was furnished and items
were to be supplied. The congressional power was to operate
neither over the whole extent of the subjects falling within the
standard in disregard of the (as yet unformulated) items, nor
to the utmost extreme of the literal meaning of any particular
item, in disregard of standard, but rather within the double limitation of standard and item.
This conclusion is buttressed by remarks of members on other
occasions, and in connection with other subjects, than the disposition to be made of the legislative-power planks of the Randolph
plan. Notably at the time of the struggle to substitute the Paterson proposals, attention was directed to the content of the
authority being given the federal government. Hamilton voiced
the opinion that Congress ought to have "indefinite" authority ;35
the notion was consistent with the strong centralizing attitude that
he took throughout the period of his attendance at the convention,
but his extreme position won little concurrence and represents the
expression of an individual and unsuccessful point of view. James
Wilson, speaking in favor of the Randolph, and against the Paterson plan, analyzed fully and in great detail the contrast between
their respective provisions. On the subject of the grant of
legislative authority, his own notes, evidently constituting a summary of the heads of the speech to be made, contrast the two
mainly by setting forth the substance of the Virginia resolutions
342 Farrand (Madison) 17.
351 Farrand (Madison) 324.
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and summarizing those from New Jersey as bestowing added
powers on Congress "in a few inadequate instances." 36 The
address must have struck his colleagues as particularly impressive
since an unusual number of them made notes of his remarks,
abstracting the points made by him, in their own language. While
the expressions employed by them cannot be attributed with any
positiveness to Wilson as expressing his views of the powers conferred, they do show, at any rate, the impression which his colleagues received of his views-or, perhaps, by subconscious identification of his statements with their own interpretations, what
was their understanding of the content of the grant. Madison set
forth the contrast between the two 3 7 in almost identical terms with

those which appear in the Wilson notes,38 thus lending some
weight to the supposition that Wilson adhered rather closely to
the expressions therein contained, and that the more condensed
abstracts of other delegates were, in this particular, paraphrases
rather than quotations. Both Yates3" and King4" accredit him
with the view that, under the Virginia plan, the Congress might
legislate as to "national" cases or concerns, while Hamilton-'
summarizes him as stating that it is to have such power "in all
matters of general concern." Under the New Jersey plan, by
way of contrast, Yates understood Wilson as saying the Congress may act "only on limited objects,' 4 2 King that it may legislate in "enumerated and partial instances, ' 4 3 and Hamilton that
its power would extend only to "partial objects." 4 Whatever the

exact language that he may have used, clearly
in conveying to his colleagues the impression
was one between the prescription of a standard
tion of items-between "national" or "general"
311 Farrand (Wilson)

277 ("Propositions-from

Wilson succeeded
that the contrast
and the specifica"cases" or "conVirginia

.

.

. 6.

The national legislature to legislate in all cases to which the state legis-

latures are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the Union may be
interrupted.-from New Jersey . . . 6. The United States in Congress
vested with additional powers only in a few inadequate instances.")
371 Farrand (Madison)
252 ("'Mr. Wilson entered into a contrast of
tile
principal points ot the two plans .... These points were .. . 6. the natl.
legislature is to make laws in all cases to which the separate states are
incompetent & -:- (in place of this) Congs. are to have additional
power
in a few cases only.")
35
Compare the phraseology set forth in notes 36 and 37, supra.
3l Farrand (Yates) 261.
401 Farrand (King) 265.
411 Farrand (Hamilton) 269.
421 Farrand (Yates) 261.
431 Farrand (King) 265.
41 Farrand (Hamilton) 269.
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cerns," and "limited," "enumerated," or "partial" "instances" or
"objects.

'4

'

The same thought recurs in Ellsworth's description

of the appropriate sphere for federal action as being limited to
"objects of a general nature." 46
SPEAKING OF "COMMERCE." Our concern so far has been with
the mental climate prevailing at the time and place when the
commerce clause was written, with the assumptions they were
making and the way they were thinking as to the general framework of the new system. It seems plain enough that the to-beenumerated heads of federal power were conceived in terms of
class membership, the common or class characteristic being the
national or general bearing of the legislative actions of the new
federal government. Henceforth inquiry may focus more sharply
on the commerce power as such.
In pursuing that inquiry, reference to a wider range of materials becomes legitimate. The query, upon what postulates was
the power over commerce written into the constitution, can only
be dealt with authoritatively upon the evidence afforded by the
proceedings and discussions of the convention prior to its- incorporation and, to a lesser extent, by subsequent statements of
the delegates, bearing on it. 47 But the problem, given the clause,

what meaning did it convey to those with whom the ultimate
fate of the new organic instrument rested, need not be solved
45According to one account, Luther 'Martin would seem to have expressed a view similar to that of Wilson, inasmuch as he was willing to
concede the federal government's power to legislate "in cases of general
interest," see I Farrand (Yates) 439. However, another report of the
same address represents him as saying, "whatever is of an external and
merely general nature shall belong to the U. S.," and as stating his concurrence in the propriety of federal legislation as to objects of "external"
(rather than general) nature, See id. (King). The difference is, of course,
substantial.
461 Farrand (Madison) 492.
7See, e.g., the letter of Sherman and Ellsworth transmitting the draft
of the proposed constitution to the governor of Connecticut, 3 Farrand 99;
Madison's letter of October 24, 1787, to Jefferson, id. 131 ; Wilson's remarks in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, id. 139, 140; the account
of a conversation with Abraham Baldwin noted in the diary of Ezra Stiles
under date of December 21, 1787, id. 168-9; letter by ladison to John Tyler,
id. 526-7 (all reinforcing the conclusions heretofore drawn as respects
the legislative jurisdiction intended to be given the states and the nation
respectively, particularly on the suggested distinction between matters of
The Tyler letter is
local, and those of national or general concern.)
especially full in its reference to the design of using the Randolph plan as a
standard to be amplified into particulars. See also on this point, Madison
in Number 10 of the Federalist (Everyman's ed.) 146; Ellsworth in the
fourth number of The Letters of a Landholder, reprinted in Ford. Essays
on the Constitution of the United States, especially at 153; Sherman in the
second number of The Letters of a Citizen of New Haven, reprinted at id.
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upon any such restricted information. The delegates deliberating
or declaiming in the several state conventions assembled to consider ratification, the eager pamphleteers who busied themselves
in influencing or attempting to influence the opinion of those
delegates or of the electorate engaged in choosing them, are as
good and as contemporary witnesses in that connection as are the
framers themselves. Accordingly, all these scattered rays of light
may be united into a single beam, and the spectrum analysis of
the contemporary understanding of the content of the grant
made from that rather than from the separate components independently.4 8
Among the first things that strikes one on going through the
mass of materials dealing with the formation and adoption of the
constitution is the nearly universal agreement that the federal
4
SFarrand will be cited in the same manner as heretofore. Other collections of source material to which frequent reference will be made are:(1) Elliott, Debates of the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution (2d ed. 1836); (2) Ford, Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States (1888); (3) Ford, Essays on the Constitution of the United States (1892) ; (4) The Federalist (Everyman's ed.) ;
(5) McMaster & Stone, Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution (1888).
(1) will be cited Elliott, ordinarily accompanied by information, in the
text or the note, as to the particular ratifying convention in which the
statement referred to was made, and by whom. In (2) the following
pamphlets have been found to have some relevance on the meaning of the
commerce clause:- Noah Webster, An Examination into the leading principles of the Federal Constitution, By a Citizen of America; John Jay, An
Address to the People of the State of New York on the Subject of the
Constitution (signed) a citizen of New York; Melancthon Smith, An
Address to the People of the State of New York: Showing the necessity
of Making Amendments . . . By a Plebeian; Tench Coxe, An Examination of the Constitution for the United States of America, By an American
Citizen; John Dickinson, The Letters of Fabius; Alexander Contee Hanson,
Remarks on the Proposed Plan of a Federal Government, By Aristides;
Edmund Randolph, Letter on the Federal Constitution; Richard Henry Lee,
Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican; George Mason, The
Objections of the Hon. George Mason to the proposed Federal Constitution;
James Iredell, Answers to Mr. Mason's objections to the new Constitution
by Marcus; David Ramsey, An Address to the Freemen of South Carolina
on the subject of the Federal Constitution (signed) Civis; they will be cited
Pamphlets, followed by the name of the author, thus, Pamphlets (Jay).
In (3) the following throw light on the commerce clause :-James Winthrop,
Letters of Agrippa; Hugh Williamson, Remarks on the New Plan of
Government; Luther Martin, Letters to the Maryland Journal; George
Clinton, The Letters of Cato; Roger Sherman, The Letters of a Citizen of
New Haven; Oliver Ellsworth, The Letters of a Landholder; Robert Yates,
The Letters of Sydney; and will be correspondingly cited, as Essays, with
appropriate attribution of authorship, e.g. Essays (Yates). (4) will be
cited Federalist with an indication of the conjectural authorship, thus,
Federalist (Madison). (5) will be cited McMaster, with notation ordinarily
made of the author of the remarks referred to and the manner or circumstances in which they were made; materials from chapter VII, composed of a pamphlet, The Letters of Centinel, will be cited McMaster
(Centinel).
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government should be given the power of regulating commerce.
The proponents of the new system consistently dwelt on the lack
of such power as one of the chief circumstances which had rendered needful a re-constitution of the federal arrangement,4 9 and
on its grant as being a major and indubitable boon of union.50
They stressed the point that every one was in agreement as to the
merit of this feature of the constitution, 1 and they seem to have
been stating a fact. In the convention itself, that part of the
report from the committee of detail which gave power to regulate
commerce "with foreign nations, and among the several States"
was agreed to without dissent,5 2 as was the later incorporation
into the clause of the power over Indian trade. 53 In the ratifying
conventions, the same lack of opposition is disclosed. Even in
those of them where the struggle over ratification was severest,
indeed in those which refused their adherence, there was no
proposal to strike from the congressional powers that of regulating
commerce, which seems rather to have been acquiesced in semper
49
See the remarks in the federal convention of Madison, 1 Farrand
(Yates) 535; the expressions in the letter accompanying transmission of the

proposed constitution to Congress, in Governeur Morris' handwriting, 2 id.
(Journal) 583, and in the copy signed by Washington as president of the
convention, 2 id. 666; the letter sent by the merchants of Rhode Island to
the federal convention, 3 id. 16; Madison's letter dated 1832 to Professor
Davis, 3 id. 519; and the holograph memorandum by Madison, 3 id. 547;
Randolph's letter to the speaker of the Virginia house, 1 Elliott 486; the
remarks in the Massachusetts convention of Dawes, 2 id. 56, 57, Gorham,
2 id. 106-7, and Bowdoin, 2 id. 129; in the North Carolina convention oi
Davie, 4 id. 19; in the South Carolina legislature of Charles Pinckney, 4 id.
253-4; in the Pennsylvania convention of Yeates, McMaster 297; and for
similar expressions in the periodical and pamphlet literature, see Pamphlets
(Jay) 72, 73; id. (Randolph) 264-7; Essays (Ellsworth) 140-1; Federalist,
No. 22 (Hamilton) 102; id. No. 42 (Madison) 214.
50In addition to the references in the preceding note, see the remarks in
the Massachusetts convention of Sam Adams, 2 Elliott 124, and of Russell,
2 id. 139; in the Pennsylvania convention of McKean, 2 id. 541-2, McMaster
379, and of Rush, McMaster 300; and in the Virginia convention of Pendleton, 3 Elliott 295; also the comments in Pamphlets (Ramsey) 376-7; Essays
(Sherman) ; Federalist, No. 23 (Hamilton) 111; id. No. 11 (Hamilton)
48 ff.
5
2See the remarks in the federal convention of Randolph, 1 Farrand
(Yates) 263, of Wilson, id. (Yates) 413, and of Charles Pinckney, 3 id.
116; in the New York convention of Robert Livingston, 2 Elliott 214, 384; in
the Virginia convention of Madison, 3 id. 260; in the Pennsylvania convention of McKean, McMaster 275; and the comments set forth in Essays
(Williamson) 401; Federalist, No. 11 (Hamilton) 48; id. No. 22 (Hamilton) 102; id. No. 40 (Madison) 199; id. No. 45 (Madison) 238. Randolph
notes it as the unanimous view of the delegates to the earlier Annapolis
convention, of whom he was one, 3 Elliott 26.
522 Farrand (Madison) 308; see id. (Journal) 304.
5 12 Farrand (Madison) 499; see id. (Journal) 495, (McHenry) 503.
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omnibus et ubique as an appropriate matter for federal control.5"
Yates, one of the dissident New York delegates, hinted at vague
sinister consequences which might follow from its adoption. 55 A
Massachusetts pamphleteer proposed an amendment withdrawing
the power over interstate commerce from Congress;" and a
57
South Carolina legislator took a sarcastic jab at the clause,
the opposition of the latter two being grounded on considerations
which will become more fully apparent later. But, for the most
part, the severest critics of the constitution expressly disclaimed
any hostility to this particular feature of the new system"' and
bore testimony that, be the blemishes in other respects what they
might, this particular grant of authority was a good and wholesome provision and had their approval.55 True enough, as we
shall see, certain exceptions and qualifications as to the exercise
4
Thus, the section is noted at 3 Elliott 378, as having been read in
the Virginia convention, but the ensuing remarks on the section make no
mention whatever of the commerce clause portion of it; in 4 id. 94, the
second (commerce) to eighth clauses of the section are noted as having been
read "without objection" in the North Carolina convention. See Foster,
Minutes of the Rhode Island Convention (ed. Cotner, 1929) 47, under date
March 3 ("Sth section of the constitution read-and now under Consideration
-no objection made . . .") The two latter states were the only ones which

rejected the constitution on its initial submission.

S5 Essays 302 ("If this (asserted usurpation on state control of Indians,
under provisions for regulating Indian trade in article 9 of the Articles) was
the conduct of Congress and their officers, when possessed of powers which
were declared by them to be insufficient for the purposes of government,
what have we reasonably to expect will be their conduct when possessed of
the powers 'to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several states and with the Indian tribes', when they are armed with legislative, executive, and judicial powers, and their laws the supreme laws of
the land.") But cf. joint statement with Lansing, cited infra, n. 59.
r4See Essays (Winthrop) 118; but cf. statements of the same writer
noted infra n. 58.
-7See the remarks of Lowndes, 4 Elliott 273, 288.
' See the observations in the New York convention of Lansing, 2
Elliott 218; in the North Carolina convention of Bloodworth, 4 id. 70;
and Wilson's notes of remarks of Findlay in the Pennsylvania convention,
McMaster 770; also the address of the minority of the Pennsylvania house
of representatives, opposed to calling a convention, id. 78, 79, and of the
minority of that convention, opposed to ratification, id. 455-6; and among
contemporary writings, id. (Centinel) 604, Pamphlets (Lee) 281, Essays
(Winthrop) 61. Sometimes this approval was accompanied with the comment that, while unobjectionable in itself, the grant of power would not be
followed by all the anticipated benefits (see the remarks of Grayson in the
Virginia convention, 3 Elliott 280, and the comment in Pamphlets (Smith)
107) or that it would be proper "under certain limitations" (see Essays
(Winthrop) 70, 79-80).
"See the joint letter of Yates and Lansing to the Governor of New
York, 3 Farrand 246; the remarks in the federal convention of Luther
Martin, 4 id. 23; in the Massachusetts convention of General Thompson, 2
Elliott 80; in the Virginia convention of Monroe, 3 id. 214, of Grayson, 3 id.
278, and of Tyler, 3 id. 641; and the comments in McMaster (Centinel)
594, 616.
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of the power were proposed, both in the Philadelphia convention
and thereafter. But the provision in its general substance was
everybody's darling.
This remarkable consensus suggests that for all concerned
the provision had some common core of meaning, that it was
understood as supplying some manifest defect in the existent
congressional powers under the confederation. At the same time
it militated against the conscious articulation of that meaning,
there being no need to elaborate what all understood and none
opposed. The upshot is that if we, today, who live in the
shadow of their handiwork, would know the connotations to them
of the grant, we must seek it in the extant records of the time
rather than in current dictionaries, since the weathering of cultures produces corresponding erosion of or accretion to the
phrases in which they express themselves. But we must seek it
obliquely, through the context in which language was used, since
of explicit formulation there is very little.
(a) THE CUSTOMS AND REVENUE ASPECT. The fiscal aspect
of commercial regulation was an incessantly recurring phase
throughout the discussion. Sometimes the form taken was that
of the intimate linking of concepts exemplified in Sherman's
advocacy, in the early days of the convention, of giving the
federal government "powers to regulate comerce [sic] and
draw therefrom a revenue," 60 sometimes the more concrete and
explicit integration expressed, on the very first day the Philadelphia convention started functioning, in Randolph's complaint of
the inability of congress to establish an impost. 61 Under the first
approach, the intimate relation of commercial regulations and of
revenue is stressed by means of the proximity of mention. Under
the second, their combination, in the particular area of customs
regulation, is actually made the whole basis for a generalized consideration of commercial regulation. The frequency with which
both appear manifests the prevalent preoccupation with this special segment of the commerce field.
With the first form, the simple juxtaposition of language, all
that can be done, for the most part, is to direct attention to the
many instances of its employment.62 No single specimen of such
601 Farrand (King) 143.
611 Farrand (Madison) 19; id. (McHenry) 25.
62
Federalist, No. 40 (Madison) 199 ("Was it not an acknowledged
object of the convention and the universal expectation of the people that the
regulation of trade should be submitted to the general government in such
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usage is entitled to any great weight, but the repeated association
of commercial provisions and revenue provisions in speech betokens a probable like association in thought. Particular interest
attaches to a few instances, however-for instance, the fusion of
commercial and fiscal provisions in a single section in the Pinckney plan,'3 and their curiously indiscriminate blending in the
fragments of the holograph notes of the members of the committee of detail.0 4 One should also note the full and systematic
elaboration of the inter-relations between commercial regulation
and revenue arrangements presented by Hamilton as the subject
matter of one entire number of the Federalist."
a form as would render it an immediate source of general revenue?") Other
illustrations may be found in the remarks in the federal convention of
Hamilton, 1 Farrand (Yates) 329, of King, id. (Madison) 198, and of
Mason, 2 id. (Madison) 344; the expressions at the beginning of the letter
transmitting the proposed constitution to the congress of the Confederation,
2 id. (journal) 583, 666; in the letter of Carrington to Jefferson, 3 id. 39;
of Charles Pinckney in his Observations on the Plan of Government, 3 id.
118; of McHenry addressing the Maryland House of Delegates, 3 id. 149;
of Yates and Lansing apprising the Governor of New York of their
reasons for non-signature, 3 id. 246; the Sherman proposals in formulating
the Paterson plan, 3 id. 615; of Hamilton in the New York convention, 2
Elliott 350; of Madison, 3 id. 255, and Grayson, 3 id. 277, in the Virginia
convention; and of Findlay in the Pennsylvania convention (as summarized
in Wilson's notes), McMaster 770. Of the campaign writings, see McMaster
(Centinel) 570-1, Pamphlets (Webster) 62, 63. id. (Smith) 107, Essays
(Williamson) 401, id. (Ellsworth) 193, Federalist, No. 62 (Hamilton or
Madison) 319. The proposed amendment, never adopted, of Gouverneur
Morris for establishing a council of executive ministers and prescribing their
respective duties, named the "Secretary of Commerce and Finance" as one
of them, charged with supervision of fiscal and commercial matters, 2
Farrand (Journal) 336-7, id. (Madison) 342-3; as reported out by the
committee of detail, the specification of all official duties was omitted and
the word "Commerce" dropped out of the name of the department, without,
however, altering the number of departments or general structure of the
system, 2 id. (Journal) 367, id. (Madison) 375.
r32 Farrand 135.
GIThe Wilson holograph, 2 Farrand 157, 158-9, is particularly striking.
It reads: "That the United States in Congress be authorized-to pass Acts
for raising a revenue--by levying duties on all goods and merchandise of
foreign growth or manufacture imported into any port of the United Statesby stamps on paper vellum or parchment-and by a postage on all letters
and packages passinq through the general post office, to be applied to such
federal purposes as they shall deem proper and expedient-to make rules and
regulations for the collection thereof-to pass Acts for the regulation of
trade and commerce as well with foreign nations as with each other to lay
and collect taxes (italicized in the original)," "The legislature of U. S.
shall have the exclusive power of raising a military land force--of regulating
the trade of the several states as well with foreign nations as with each other
-of levying duties upon imports and exports." The two versions apparently
represent different stages in the refinement of the draft. See also the
Randolph-Rutledge holograph, 2 id. 142-3. where the commerce clause is
wedged in between the grant of the federal taxing power and the prohibition
of state duties on imports, in a rather haphazard-appearing listing.
05
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The identification of commercial regulation with customs
stands out plainly in Wilson's exclamation, when the provision
forbidding export duties by the federal government was being
debated, "To deny this power is to take from the common govt.
half the regulation of trade,"68 the other half being, as the context
shows, the corresponding control over imports. Between them,
the implication plainly is, they constituted the whole of commercial regulation. This was an exaggerated view of the matter, for,
as will hereafter appear, other things besides duties on imports
and exports were discussed as falling within the commerce
clause. Nevertheless, customs control obviously was regarded
as the principal ingredient of commercial regulation. An outstanding defect under the articles, it was commonly felt, was the
lack of power in the United States either to raise a revenue to
meet expenses and discharge the continental debt or to cope with
discriminatory commercial regulations of foreign countries, in
particular of Great Britain.87 The efforts of some states to satisfy
congressional requisitions out of their imposts were defeated by
diversion of foreign shipments to others which, by chance or by
design, undercut the tariffs of the former; and, until a uniform
control of the subject was placed in federal hands, other nations
could circumvent with impunity the commercial regulations of
the several states."' Moreover, the states were using their imposts as weapons against each other, either offensively, as where
662 Farrand (Madison) 363.

67Wilson said, addressing the Pennsylvania convention, "The commencement of peace was likewise the commencement of our distress and
disgrace. Devoid of power, we could neither prevent the excessive importations which lately deluged the country, nor even raise from that excess a
contribution to the public revenue; devoid of importance, we were unable
to command a sale for our commodities in a foreign market," 3 Farrand
141. Of like tenor are the remarks in the federal convention of Randolph,
1 id. (McHenry) 25; of Charles Pinckney in the Observations on the
Plan of Government, 3 id. 116; of Dawes in the Massachusetts convention,
2 Elliott 58-59; of Monroe in the Virginia convention, 3 id. 213; of Charles
Pinckney in the South Carolina legislature, 4 id. 253; and of Wilson in the
Pennsylvania convention, McMaster 297-8; as well as the expressions set
forth in memoranda of Madison, 3 Farrand 548, in McMaster (Centinel)
605, Essays (Williamson) 402; id. (Ellsworth) 140-1; Federalist. No. 22
(Hamilton) 102-3. But see the remarks of Lansing in the New York
convention, indicating an opinion that the individual states were willing,
without changing the articles otherwise to cede the requisite power to
Congress, 2 Elliott 218.
GSDawes in the Masrachusetts convention, 2 Elliott 57 ("... as Congress

could not make laws, whereby they could obtain a revenue, in their own
ways from impost or excise, they multiplied their requisition on the several
states. When a state was thus called on, it would perhaps impose new
duties on its own trade to procure money for paying its quota of federal
demands. This would drive the trade to such neighboring states as made
no such new impositions; thus the revenue would be lost with the trade, and
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the importing states imposed tariffs the ultimate incidence of
which was calculated to fall on others not blessed by geography
with as good and accessible harbors,69 or defensively, as by
strengthening their tariff walls against each other to compensate
for revenue deficiencies resulting from diversion of foreign shipments to the states with the least onerous imposts7 0
The course of the discussion belies the heresy, later fathered
by an illustrious sire, that the restrictions on state power as to
levying imposts were referable to the taxing power and not to
the power of regulating commerce. 71 So far as the convention was
concerned, these clauses formed part of the commercial system
being incorporated into the constitution,- 2 and the ensuing declamation and pamphleteering dealt with them on that basis. 7'
the only resort would be to a direct tax.") Other comments on this same
problem may be found in Davie's remarks in the North Carolina convention,
4 id. 18, in Federalist, No. 22 (Hamilton), in Madison's letter of 1832 to
Professor Davis, 3 Farrand 519, and in certain memorandum notes of
Madison, id. 547-8.
69Pamphlets (Webster) 62-63; Essays (Williamson) 404; Madison
memoranda, 3 Farrand 542. New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and
Virginia were named as having been the offenders in a letter by Madison
in 1832, 3 Farrand 519. The limited power left with the states to levy
import or export duties was viewed with alarm by some of the framers as
likely to perpetuate this danger, see remarks of Madison, 2 Farrand (Madison) 441, and of Gouverneur Morris, id. 442. Cf. Federalist, No. 7 (Hamilton) 028-29.
7 Essays (Williamson) 403 ("Does one of the states attempt to raise
a little money by imports or other commercial regulations? A neighbouring
state immediately alters her laws, and defeats the revenue by throwing the
trade into a different channel. Instead of supporting or assisting, we are
uniformly taking the advantage of one another.") And see the remarks in
the Virginia convention of Randolph, 3 Elliott 82, and of Madison, id. 260;
in the South Carolina legislature of Charles Pinckney, 4 id. 253-4; and in
a memorandum by Madison, 3 Farrand 547-8.
T1The doctrine was propounded by Chief Justice Marshall, in his opinion
in Gibbons v. Ogden, (1824) 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 201-2, 6 L. Ed. 23.
72See the remarks in the federal convention of Madison. 2 Farrand
(Madison) 441, 442, 588-9, and his comments with reference to export duties
in his letter of October 24, 1787, to Jefferson, 3 id. 135. The evidence
against Marshall's companion contention, that the tonnage tax provisions
dealt with tax rather than commercial matters, is even more direct and
forcible. "Mr. Madison. Whether the states are now restrained from
laying tonnage duties depends on the extent of the power 'to regulate commerce.' These terms are vague ....

Mr. Langdon insisted that the regula-

tion of tonnage was an essential part of the regulation of trade and that
the states ought to have nothing to do with it." 2 id. 625.
"aFederalist, No. 44 (Madison) 229 ("The restraint on the power of the
states over imports and exports is enforced by all the arguments which
prove the necessity of submitting the regulation of trade to the federal
councils. It is needless, therefore, to remark further on this head, than
that the manner in which the restraint is qualified seems well calculated to
secure to the states a reasonable discretion in providing for the conveniency
of their imports and exports, and to the United States a reasonable check
against the abuse of this discretion.") For other illustrations, see McHenry's
address to the Maryland House of Delegates, 3 Farrand 149, and the comments in Pamphlets (Iredell) 366, 367.
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Indeed, in its primordial form the prohibition of state imposts
appeared merely as a qualifying clause in a section of the commerce clause, wedged in between matters of indubitably "com74
merce," rather than "tax," character.
The office of the commerce clause, by and large, was to afford
an effective control over imports and exports ;7- and the characteristic method of exercising such control, namely, the levy of
imposts, was the type-situation with reference to which the con76
tent of the commerce clause was ordinarily evaluated.
The delegates were sophisticated enough to recognize the dual
role of imposts and duties, as sources of revenue and as instruments of commercial policy, indicating the differentiation clearly
when it seemed material to do so. 7 They were conscious of, and
not hostile to, the potentiality of manipulating duties for the
protection and encouragement of particular enterprises. Indeed,
this very feature constituted a strong recommendation of the
system, in the minds of some, both in and out of the convention.7 8 When the intimate relations between commerce and fiscal
74See the Randolph-Rutledge holograph draft, prepared apparently
for use
in the committee of detail, 1 Farrand 142, 143.
75See the remarks in the federal convention of Sherman, 2 Farrand
(Madison) 308; in the Virginia convention of Madison, 3 Elliott 260; in the
North Carolina convention of Davie, 4 id. 18; and the comments in
Pamphlets (Smith) 107, Essays (Ellsworth) 140, 193 and in Federalist, No.
12 (Hamilton) 56, 57, id. No. 42 (Madison) 214-5; and see the remarks in
the federal convention of Luther Martin, enumerating the characteristic
export products of the several states and characterizing them as "articles of
commerce," with the implication that they were peculiarly entitled to that
4 Farrand 25.
description,
76See the discussion of August 21 on the prohibition of state export
duties, 2 Farrand (Madison) 360-4, particularly the statements of Langdon,
Ellsworth, Sherman, Madison, Wilson and Clymer; the remarks of Charles
Pinckney in the Observations on the Plan of Government, 3 id. 116; of
Dawes in the Massachusetts convention, 2 Elliott 58-59; of Monroe in the
Virginia convention, 3 id. 214-5: of Wilson in the Pennsylvania convention,
McMaster 388; of Madison in a letter of 1832 to Professor Davis, 3 Farrand
520-1; in the letter of "Plain Truth," McMaster 188-9; in Essays (Ellsworth) 176, id. (Clinton) 271-2, id. (Williamson) 404. The extreme form,
of exclusion of foreign produce, was the subject of remarks by Gorham in
the Massachusetts convention, 2 Elliott 106-7.
77E.g., Clymer's observation on prohibition to the states of export duties,
2 Farrand (Madison) 363 ("--He moved as a qualification of the power of
taxing Exports that it should be restrained to regulations of trade by inserting after the word 'duty' sec. 4 art. VII the words 'for the purpose of
revenue.'"),
and King's statement, 2 id. (Madison) 442.
78
Dawes in the Massachusetts convention, 2 Elliott 57, 59; Davie in the
North Carolina convention, 4 id. 20; Essays (Winthrop) 80. This is confirmed by Madison's letter of 1828 to J. C. Cabell, 3 Farrand 477, and of
1832 to Professor Davis, id. 520-1. Cf. Mason's argument for allowing the
states at least a measure of authority to impose import duties so that they
might encourage particular manufactures, 2 id. (Madison) 441, and King's
remarks of like tenor, id. (Madison) 442.
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management are stressed, therefore, it must not be understood as
implying any suggestion that the commerce clause was inserted
as pre-eminently a money-raising scheme, although that consideration was present. Rather, what is important to observe is the
disclosed uniformity in thinking of levies on imports and exports
as the appropriate instrumental device by which the grant of
power would be effectuated.
It seems to have been precisely this feature of the commerce
clause which generated for it the almost universal assent already
described. 7 1 Some of the opponents of the new system alluded
specifically to its workings in this connection in explanation of
their acquiescence in the propriety of granting Congress the
power over commerce.80 As will appear subsequently, in reviewing
other fields of activity thought of at the time as embraced in commercial regulation, this was the only one of the lot as to which no
qualifications or restrictions of the federal power over commerce
were proposed. It, apparently, was the "regulation of commerce"
which united so many suffrages, with a primacy and an appeal
sufficiently strong to commend the grant even to those who, in
other particulars, wished its exercise to be restrained or confined.
(b) THE MARITI-ME AND NAVIGATION ASPECT. While the
fiscal aspect of commercial regulation lingered pervasively in the
background, a quite different phase occupied the bitter forefront
of discussion. The two were neatly paired in Pinckney's observation that, in granting to the federal government the power to
79Luther Martin. in his address to the Maryland House of Delegates,

intimated indeed an objection to the fiscal aspect of federal commerce rqgulation, (see 3 Farrand 156), as also in his Genuine Information (id. 200) ;
but, inasmuch as he had unequivocally agreed to it as necessary and desirable, in an address in the Philadelphia convention (4 id. 23), it is
impossible to consider the objection as an expression of sincere dissent, or
to regard it as other than the making of a point by an extremely skillful
politician and advocate (which he was). It was charged by various contemporaries that the opposition and non-signature of some members of the
New York delegation were grounded in the desire of that state, or of a
party in it, to preserve unimpaired its advantageous situation for levying
imposts, see Essays (Ellsworth) 176; letter of Madison to Thomas Cooper,
3 Farrand 474; Pinckney's Observations on the Plan of Government, id.
116 semble. This may have been so; but at any rate, they did not care to
avow it, if that were the case, no such reason being assigned in any of the
writings or discussions of the New York antis.
80
See the remarks in the Virginia convention of Monroe, 3 Elliott 213.
215, and of Tyler, id. 640; in the addresses to the people, by the minority
in the Pennsylvania legislature which voted to call the ratifying convention
in that state, McMaster 78-79, and by the minority of convention delegates
opposed to ratification, id. 455-6; in (Wilson's notes of) Findlay's remarks
in the Pennsylvania convention, id. 770; and of the campaign literature, see
id. (Centinel) 604; Pamphlets (Smith) 107; Essays (Winthrop) 80-81.
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regulate trade, "the intention ... [was] . . .to invest the United

States with the power of rendering our maritime regulations uniform and efficient, and to enable them to raise a revenue." 8'
When, decades later, Chief Justice Marshall observed that "All
America understands and has uniformly understood the word
commerce to comprehend navigation,"" 2 he spoke accurately. What
he omitted to note was that that very understanding had caused
sturdy opposition to the constitution in some quarters, and in
others had rendered it acceptable only in consequence of a specific
compromise, with the navigation sector of commercial regulation
the concession yielded to obtain compensatory special advantages.
The first dim outline of trouble shaping-and indeed virtually
83
the first mention of navigation in the records of the convention appears in the Randolph-Rutledge draft for the committee of
detail, in the form of a qualification of the power to regulate
commerce, that "a navigation act shall not be passed but with the
consent of . .. Y3 of the members present ... 84 Randolph seems
initially to have generalized the requirement so as to prescribe
an extraordinary majority for any regulation of commerce; but,
on further consideration, either he or Rutledge deleted the provisions except as they related to enactment of a navigation act. 85
In both its broader and its narrower forms, the qualification assumes prophetic significance when one notes its appearance in
the draft prepared by Randolph of Virginia and Rutledge of
South Carolina, as contrasted with its absence from that of Wilson of Pennsylvania.
The proposition did not come before the convention, however, until near the end of August. Pinckney then "gave notice
that he would move that the consent of 3/4 of the whole legislature be necessary to the enacting a law respecting the regulation
of trade or the formation of a navigation act,"886 a resolution
apparently conforming with his original inclinations expressed
in his plan for a constitution,$- and which he carried into effect
four days later by moving "that no act of the legislature for the
813 Farrand 116.

S-Gibbons v. Ogden, (1824) 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 190, 6 L. Ed. 23.
8
3Randolph, in listing the "blessings" the existing government was
"incapable to produce" had named, inter alia, "the improvement of inland
navigation," 1 Farrand (McHenry) 27.
841 Farrand 143.
851 Farrand 143.
862 Farrand (McHenry) 420.
8
7See the statements in his Observations on the Plan of Government, 3
Farrand 118.
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purpose of regulating the commerce of the United States with
foreign powers or among the several states shall be passed without the assent of /3rds of the members of each House.""" As will
be observed, the proportion of votes required to enact a commercial regulation was reduced from that indicated in the notice to
that which he had previously had in mind. More significantly, the
terms of the original Pinckney plan were resurrected by elimination of specific mention of a navigation act from the resolution,
indicating that, in its author's opinion, it was comprehended under
the general designation of commercial regulation and needed no
categorical reference. That fear of regulations of navigation was
the real gist of the demand for the extraordinary majority does
not rest on this inference, however. It is spelled out clearly enough
in the warm debate which occurred as to Pinckney's motion.5 9
Ultimately the motion was defeated, 0 it was charged by horse
trading between the delegates of the sea-faring New England
states and those from the slave-holding Southern states, the
latter surrendering the demand for extraordinary majorities in
connection with commercial regulations, i.e., navigation laws, in
return for immunity of slave importation from congressional interference prior to 1808. 91 Randolph took the occasion to remark
that, if the motion were defeated, he might feel compelled to
withhold his assent from the constitution. 2 He was as good as his
word, explicitly grounding his non-signature on the "submission
"2 Farrand (Journal) 446; id. (Madison) 449.
K'See the entire debate of August 29, 2 Farrand (Madison) 449-452.
The common understanding of the disputants on both sides is revealed by
the interchange between two North Carolina delegates. "Mr. Williamson
%%as in favor of making two-thirds instead of a majority requisite, as more
satisfactory to the Southern people .... He acknowledged that he did not
think the motion requiring 3 necessary in itself, because if a majority of
Northern states should push their regulations too far the S.[outhern] states
would build ships for themselves; but he knew the Southern people were
apprehensive on this subject and would be pleased with the precaution. Mr.
Spaight was against the motion. The Southern states could at any time
save themselves from oppression, by building ships for their own use," id.
449-450. Martin, who was on the committee to which the resolution was
referred, describes it as "the restrictive clause relative to navigation acts,"
3 id. 211.
01'2 Farrand (Journal) 446; id. (Madison) 453.
112 Farrand (Madison) 449 n.: Martin, Genuine Information, 3 id.
210-1; letter of Madison to Robert Walsh of November 27, 1819, 3 id. 436.
It should be noted, however, that the only Southern state which eventually
voted against the motion was South Carolina, and that, even if it had joined
with the others in its own section, the combined votes of the Northern and
Middle states, which were united solidly against the measure, would have
sufficed to defeat it.
922 Farrand (Madison)

452-3.
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of commerce to a mere majority in the legislature. ' 93 A like
sentiment, considerably amplified in statement, was voiced by
Mason as a reason why he did not sign.9 4 Others of the Southern
delegates remained opposed to this feature of the new constitution,
although not violently enough so to induce conduct similar to that
of Randolph and Mason.9 5
This objection, that the power to regulate commerce, by a mere
majority, would facilitate adoption of a navigation act beneficial
to the shipping states and prejudicial to the South, was a favorite
subject of complaint with the Southern opponents of the constitution, alike in the occasional literature and in the debates
over ratification. 96 No one denied that the commerce power did
indeed extend to permit regulations of navigation. The foes of
the new constitution in the North said as little as possible about
these potentialities of the clause,97 which its adherents in that
section extolled as one of the solid advantages of the new arrangement, 9 - and for which those in the South apologized as mere
compensation for substantial concessions made to that part of the
country. 99 North Carolina alone demanded the incorporation of
the extraordinary majority as to any "navigation law or law
93
Letter to the speaker of the Virginia house, 3 Farrand 127, Pamphlets
(Randolph) 275.
942 Farrand 639-640. Pamphlets (Mason) 331. Circulation of this part
of Mason's attack on the constitution was confined, it seems, to the Southern
states; it was exscinded from copies sent into the New England states, see
(Ellsworth) 162.
Essays
95
Pinckney, Remarks in convention, 2 Farrand (Madison) 633; Butler,
letter to Weedon Butler, 3 id. 304.
96Letter of Richard Henry Lee to Randolph, 1 Elliott 504; Lowndes in
the South
Carolina legislature, 4 id. 288; Pamphlets (Lee) 319.
97
The dissenting minority in the Pennsylvania legislature which called
the ratifying convention acknowledged the propriety of giving Congress an
"entire jurisdiction over maritime affairs," McMaster 79; and see id. (Centinel) 594. An obscure passage in Essays (Winthrop) 53-54 seems to indicate 9opposition to navigation laws; and see id. (Winthrop) 81.
8Dawes in the Massachusetts convention, 2 Elliott 58; Phillips in the
Massachusetts convention, id. 67; Russell in the Massachusetts convention.
id. 139; Bradford in the Rhode Island convention, Foster, Minutes of the
Rhode Island Convention 43, semble; Essays (Ellsworth) 140-I.
99
Letter of the North Carolina delegates to the governor, 3 Farrand 84

("...

While we were taking so much care to guard ourselves against being

over reached, and to form rules of taxation that might operate in our
favor it is not to be supposed that our Northern brethren were inattentive
to their particular interest. A navigation Act or the power to regulate
commerce in the hands of the national government by which American ships
and seamen may be fully employed is the desirable weight that is thrown
into the Northern scale. This is what the Southern states have given in
exchanges for the advantages we mentioned above. . . .") ; Charles Cotes-

worth. Pinckney in the South Carolina legislature, 4 Elliott 284; Pam,)hlets
(Ramsay) 376-7 (an unusually emphatic justification); Essays (Williamson) 401.
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regulating commerce," as an amendment to the constitution.1°0
The Maryland convention by a formal vote refused to make such
a recommendation. 0 1
The conflict, sectional throughout, leaves no room for doubt
that the power to enact a navigation law was included in that of
regulating commerce. Indeed, as has also been seen to be the
case in connection with import-export control, there was a
02
tendency at times to treat the two as substantially synonymous.1
Witness the variant forms in which the proposition was presented;
likewise such statements, startling in their literal language, as
that "the power of regulating commerce was a pure concession on
the part of the S. (outhern) states,"'1 0 3 that "it was the true interest
of the S. states to have no regulation of commerce," 1 4 and
that self help by the latter against excessive use of the power
granted was available in the potential power to build their own
ships and develop their own maritime interests. 10 1 Hamilton, with
greater refinement of thought, distinguished an active from a
passive commerce, placing in the former category matters relating
to navigation and the carrying trade, and urging as a strong
argument for adoption of the constitution the anticipated effect
of the commerce clause in securing to American enterprise this
branch of commerce, instead of confining it to the mere passive
commerce of supplying products to and a market for foreign
nations." 6
Two provisions, incorporated at the instance of the Maryland
delegation, further testify to the understanding that regulations of
-1" Elliott 245.
1-12 Elliott 552-3.

1112E.g., Madison's remarks in the Virginia convention, 3 Elliott 332
("If the commercial interests be in danger, why are we alarmed about the
carrying trade ? Why is it said that the carrying states will predominate if
commerce be in danger?")
1o-Charles Pinckney's remarks, 2 Farrand (Madison) 449; and see
statement of Butler, id. (Madison) 451.
l°1ORemarks of Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, 2 Farrand (Madison) 449.
l",See the statements of Williamson, 2 Farrand (Madison) 450-1;
Spaight, id. 451; Rutledge, id. 452; letter of North Carolina delegates to
Governor Caswell, 3 id. 84; remarks of Madison, 2 id. (Madison) 451
semble. The opposition expressed skepticism, however, as to the practicability of this mode of redress, see letter of Richard Henry Lee to Randolph,
1 Elliott 504-5. Encouragement of shipbuilding was mentioned by the
friends of the constitution as one of the benefits to be anticipated under the
commerce power, (see remarks of McKean in the Pennsylvania convention,
2 Elliott 542, McMaster 379; letter of "A Pennsylvania Farmer," id. 128;
Pamphlets (Jay) 73 semble; id. (Iredell) 357-8; Essays (Ellsworth) 194)
and this phase was expressly excepted from condemnation by some of those
in opposition
(see Essays (Winthrop) 61).
106Federalist, No. 11.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

navigation were within the purview of the power to regulate
commerce. One,; the well-known clause prohibiting Congress
from establishing preferences or discriminations between the ports
of the different states and specifying precisely what might not be
done in that connection, deals purely with questions of navigation, excluding from the grant of the commercial power certain
matters which it was apprehended might otherwise fall within it.' ° r
The other, stemming from a fear lest the control of commerce and
of imposts deprive the states of the charges on vessels customarily
levied to defray the cost of maintenance of navigation facilities, 0 s
is concerned, in its most interesting aspect, with the location of
control over such facilities and in that aspect will be noted hereafter. It did, however, find expression in the provision authorizing the states, with the permission of Congress, to levy tonnage
duties, although there was a mild dispute as to whether they did
not possess that power any way. In any event, the provision
was incorporated, whether by way of clarification or donation
of authority. The important thing for present purposes is the
reference of this particular levy, so peculiarly and closely connected with shipping, to the category of commercial regulation on
the part of some at least of the delegates.10 9 The inclusion of
the subject-matter "navigation" within the "commerce" whose
regulation was confided to Congress was thus conspicuously
brought to the attention of all concerned at various stages in
the formulation and adoption of the constitution, was never
objected to as an erroneous interpretation of the power, and in the
upshot won wide acquiescence.
Moreover, this broad category itself was broken down into subcategories. As with the power over imposts and customs, so
with that over navigation, the proponents of the constitution were
fond of drawing attention to the discriminations against American
lO7This- was evidently the content of the "restrictory clauses drawn up
for the VII article respecting commerce" which Martin exhibited to his
Maryland colleagues on August 22, see 2 Farrand (McHenry) 378. It was
introduced by Carroll and Martin on August 25 and opposed by no one,
although Gorham "thought such a precaution unnecessary," id. (Madison)
417-8. Its terms seem to have been generally acceptable, objection being
voiced on a single occasion, for the rather fanciful reason that "the only use of
such a regulation is, to keep each state in complete ignorance of its own
resources," Essays (Winthrop) 70.
'osSee 2 Farrand (McHenry) 212, in which McHenry tells of mentioning his foreboding to the Maryland delegation; his renewed consideration
of the problems at a later date, id. 504, 530; and various alternative drafts
of resolutions relating to the subject, id. 634.
09
1 See 2 Farrand (Madison) 626.
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shipping imposed by foreign countries, notably Great Britain,
the impotence of the states individually to concert any effective
opposition, and the need for a central legislature capable of bringing the united pressure of all the states to bear against such hostile
regulations." 0 The idea was that of opposing regulation of
shipping with regulation of shipping, "exclusion ...to exclusion,
and restriction to restriction," '' of enabling Congress to retaliate
by the adoption and implementation of policies parallel to those
which were being enforced by other nations.
Preferences were to be given American shipping and American
seamen,' 1 ' possibly by excluding foreign vessels from our carrying trade either absolutely, or except to permit them to bring
in the produce of the nation under whose flag they sailed,"" except,
of course, in so far as commercial treaties provided for reciprocal
ilOThis attitude was cogently stated by Charles Pinckney in the South
Carolina legislature, 4 Elliott 253, 254 ("It must be recollected that upon the
conclusion of the definitive treaty, great inconveniences were experienced as
resulting from the inefficacy of the Confederation. The one first and most
sensibly felt was the destruction of our commerce occasioned by the restrictions of other nations, whose policy it was not in the power of the general
government to counteract. . . . Frequent and unsuccessful attempts were
made by Congress to obtain the necessary powers. The states, too, individually attempted, by navigation acts and other commercial provisions, to
remedy the evil. These, instead of correcting, served but to increase it;
their regulations interfered not only with each other but, in almost every
instance, with treaties existing under the authority of the Union. Hence
arose the necessity of some general and permanent system, which should
at once embrace all interests, and, by placing the states upon firm and united
ground, enable them effectually to assert their commercial rights.") For
expressions of similar sentiments, see the remarks in the federal convention
of Clymer, 2 Farrand (Madison) 450, and Madison, id. (Madison) 452; in
the Massachusetts convention of Dawes, 2 Elliott 58; in the North Carolina
convention of Davie, 4 id. 18-19, 20; and, in the miscellaneous literature,
Pinckney in the Observations on the Plan of Government, 3 Farrand 116;
Madison's memoranda, 3 id. 547-8; McMaster (Centinel) 605, 616;
Pamphlets (Jay) 72-73; id. (Randolph) 265; id. (Iredell) 358; Essays
(Ellsworth) 140-1; Federalist, No. 11 (Hamilton) 49-50. Incidental benefits
anticipated from the commerce clause were the restoration to the United
States of .the trade with the West Indies (see remarks of Rutledge, 2
Farrand (Madison) 452; memoranda of Madison, 3 id. 547-8; McMaster
(Ctntinel) 605; Federalist, No. 11 (Hamilton) 49-50) and the development
of a navy (see remarks of Gouverneur Morris, 2 Farrand (Madison) 450,
and of Madison, id. (Madison) 452; Pamphlets (Ramsay) 377 semble;
Federalist, No. 11 (Hamilton) 50, 52), both of them considerations intimately connected with navigation and so evidencing the fact that its control
was understood as comprehended within the grant of power to regulate
commerce.
'1 1 Pamphlets (Randolph) 265.
"-'See remarks of Gouverneur Morris, 2 Farrand (Madison) 450;
Pamphlets (Iredell) 357; id. (Ramsay) 376-7; Essays (Williamson) 401.
1'This thought was brought out particularly in the Massachusetts convention; see statements of Dawes, 2 Elliott 58, of Phillips, id. 67, and of
Russell, id. 139. And see Federalist, No. 11 (Hamilton) 49.
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equality of shipping." 4 In appropriate contingencies Congress
was to have power to exclude the vessels of particular foreign
nations from our ports." 5
The control exercisable by the United States was not to be
limited to intercourse with foreign nations, however, but, in accordance with the familiar provisions in other nations' regulations, was
to extend to the coastal shipping between American ports. 1 6 It
was even suggested, somewhat hesitantly, that the navigation of
interstate interior waterways might perhaps be within the scope
of regulation provided for by the commerce clause. 1 7 In the
main, however, commerce was a matter of sea-borne traffic, as
is shown by the general tenor of the foregoing statements and
emphasized by such declarations as that New York had "but one
port and outlet to your commerce,"' " s and that establishment of
a navy was essential "if we mean to be a commercial people,"" 9
and by the classification as commerce of the fisheries off the
Canadian banks. 20 Again, the most systematic treatment of the
commerce clause in the whole course of discussion, that of Hamilton in the eleventh number of the Federalist, devotes only about a
tenth of its space to the domestic commerce of the country, and
even then discusses it largely as instrumental to the furthering of
2
maritime commerce with other nations.1 '

As the amendments incorporated at the instance of the Maryland delegation show, tonnage duties and regulations governing
entry clearance, and the levy of imposts in the various ports of
the country were comprehended within the concept of regulations
of navigation, which in turn was a component in the broader notion
of "commerce," entertained by the delegates.
In essence, the thinking on this branch of the subject is revealed to have been in terms characteristic of the ordinary contemporary "navigation laws," with which the states had had ex"14See statement of Gorham, 2 Farrand (Madison) 453.
"15Charles Cotesworth Pinckney in the South Carolina legislature, 4
Elliott 305.
I-See remarks of Madison in the Federal convention, 2 Farrand (Madison) 452, of Dawes in the Massachusetts convention, 2 Elliott 58, and of
Wilson in the Pennsylvania convention, McMaster 357.
ll7McHenry's notes, 2 Farrand 504.
liSPamphlets (Jay) 84; this is also the tenor'of Madison's remarks in
Federalist, No. 41, 209. For a similar comment as to New Hampshire, see
Essays (Ellsworth) 193.
119Federalist, No. 24 (Hamilton) 119; id. No. 34 (Madison) 161.
i 2 OLetter of Pierce Butler to Weedon Butler, 3 Farrand 304; Essays
(Ellsworth)
194.
121See Federalist, pp. 48-53 inclusive.
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perience as British colonies, and which were then in common
employment among maritime nations.
(c) THE MERCANTILE ASPECT. There are occasional fleeting
glimpses of still a third class of subjects as being embraced within
the grant of the power "to regulate commerce." Its content is,
perhaps, most clearly apparent in the vigorous efforts made to
withdraw a portion of it from the ambit of congressional action,
culminating in proposals by five ratifying conventions to amend
the constitution to provide "that Congress erect no company of
22
merchants with exclusive advantages of commerce."
The attempt of the Parliament of Great Britain to regulate
commerce in 1773 by giving the British East India Company a
virtual monopoly of the American tea trade, with its dramatic
climax in the Boston Tea Party, was a crucial misstep in preRevolutionary commercial regulation, 123 with which presumably
the delegates to the Philadelphia convention were all familiar.
Nobody appears to have been thinking of the commerce clause in
terms of that experience, however, and the matter might well
never have arisen, had not Madison injudiciously opened it up in
mid-August by moving that Congress be authorized to grant charters of incorporation. 124 Even then the whole issue might have
been avoided, since the committee to which proposed amendments
were referred failed to report the motion favorably." 5 But Madison returned to the attack in the closing days of the convention.
with an amendment to a pending proposal for authorizing Congress to establish canals, broadening and extending it into his
favorite provision for congressional charters of incorporation.
Apparently he was thinking innocently enough of enabling Congress to take steps to improve transportation facilities; but the fat
was in the fire. King protested that the provision would be referred
in some localities to the abhorred idea of a bank, in others to mercantile monopolies. Wilson retorted that the power to establish
mercantile monopolies was already included in the power to regu2

2 See the instruments of ratification of Massachusetts, 1 Elliott 322,
323, of New Hampshire, id. 325, 326. of New York, id. 329, 330, and of
Rhode Island, id. 335, 337; and the amendments proposed in conjunction with
rejection by the first
North Carolina convention, 4 id. 245, 246. The New
York and Rhode Island proposals differed slightly in language from that
quoted in the text, bot omitting the words "of merchants" and the former
adding the further injunction that Congress should not "grant monopolies."
23
'7 See McLaughlin, Constitutional History of the United States (1935)

77.

1242 Farrand (Journal) 321; id. (Madison) 325.
12-52 Farrand (journal) 366-7; id. (Madison) 375.
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late trade. Mason demurred, expressing antipathy to monopolies
coupled with a conviction that the commerce clause did not authorize them. The resolution was re-confined to the original subject of canals, and in that form defeated. 126
The consequences of Madison's undue zeal and Wilson's inept
explanation were not to be avoided. The hypothesized power to
erect commercial monopolies gave Gerry a reason (or a pretext)
for withholding his signature and assent.12 T Mason stuck by his
original declaration that the commerce clause gave no such power,
but did find authority for that purpose latent in the "necessary
and proper clause and listed that among his reasons for not
supporting the constitution.12 8 Similar apprehension was expressed,
in other quarters, in connection with the provision giving Congress
exclusive jurisdiction in the federal district to be erected.Y- Elsewhere, Gerry's fear of the monopolistic potentialities of the commerce clause was adopted and elaborated.13 0
Whether the amendment was lost because of a lack of conviction that the constitution gave power to erect mercantile monopolies or because of a willingness that Congress should have
such power, no one can say. The whole controversy did focus
attention on the notion that the commerce clause gave Congress
jurisdiction over the affairs of the merchant, as well as those of
the mariner and of the customs official. But again there is danger
in treatiig eighteenth century politicians as if they were talking
twentieth century language. We must strive instead to discover
the contemporary meaning of merchant, who composed that class
and what were its understood activities and attributes, rather than
assume its employment with the connotations which it currently
possesses.
The records afford even less in the way of guidance here than
has been found as to the meaning of commerce, probably because
1262 Farrand (Madison) 615-6.

Farrand (Madison) 633; id. (King) 635-6.
Farrand (Mason) 640; Pamphlets (Mason) 331. See also the reflections of McHenry, 2 Farrand (McHenry) 529-530. Iredell argued that
the privileges and immunities clause, and that forbidding preference to or
discrimination against ports, were conclusive against this interpretation,
(Iredell) 357.
Pamphlets
129 Grayson in the Virginia convention, 3 Elliott 291, 431; Essays (Winthrop) 61. See amendment 13 proposed by the first North Carolina convention in rejecting the constitution, 1 Elliott 245.
13OEssays (Winthrop) 61, 71, 79-80, 97, 98. A like view is hinted at
in McMaster (Centinel) 625, although it is not entirely clear that the fear
of a monopoly was being placed squarely on the power of commercial
regulation.
1272
1282
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the assumption of a common understanding was equally great and
the problem itself was more peripheral. The term was only occasionally employed; but, after examination of the instances where
it was used, it assumes a tolerably definite meaning. Sometimes,
of course, the context is quite colorless and gives no assistance in
discovering the import.13 1 The frequency of reference concurrently
to the activities of merchants and navigators (or seamen) 3 2 is,
however, suggestive. There is naturally no intention to imply that
the two occupations were deemed to be synonymous; but their repeated immediate proximity does afford some indication that their
activities were thought of in connection with each other, raising an
inference that typically they may have been fellow-participants in
some common function or service.
What did the foes of the new constitution have to say specifically about the merchant and his activities? "The truth is this
country buys more than it sells; It imports more than it exports.
There are too many merchants in proportion to the farmers and
manufacturers," was one New Yorker's explanation why no radical
governmental revision was urgently needed. 1 ' A quite different
argument to support the same point issued from Massachusetts;
the balance of trade, it was said, was largely in that state's favor;
"the credit of our merchants is therefore fully established in
foreign countries."'' 34 If the new scheme were adopted, one warned,
the merchants would be its victims; the result of the proposal to
raise revenues to support the government by import duties would
be that prices would rise, "the consumers must be fewer; the merchants must import less; trade will languish," and the whole
notion was thus doomed to failure. 35 Conversely a Southern opponent pictured them as the villains of the new dispensation; the
regulation of commerce by a mere majority "will enable the merchants of the Northern and Eastern states not only to demand an
exorbitant freight, but to monopolize the purchase of the . . .
[Southern staple] . . . commodities."'1 6 While these arguments,
each tailored to the sentiments of the locality to which the author
131
E.g., Pamphlets (Smith) 94 ("The merchant drives his commerce,

and none
can deprive him of the gain he honestly acquires.")
' 3 2See the language of Madison in the convention, 2 Farrand (Madison)

451; also Essays (Williamson) 405; Federalist, No. 11 (Hamilton) 51, id.
No. 4133(Jay) 14.
Pamphlets (Smith) 107.
234Essays (Winthrop) 72.
'13 Essays (Clinton) 271.
1362 Farrand (Mason) 640; Pamphlets (Mason) 331.
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was addressing himself, were diverse enough in all conscience, they
do exhibit one uniformity. Throughout the merchant is alluded to
as one primarily concerned in importation, one who can manipulate
carrying charges and monopolize the dealings in staples, a person
possessed of credit abroad. This consistency of thought is wholly
harmonious with the conjoint references to merchants and seamen
already observed.
The proponents of the constitution spoke in the same strain.
Under the feeble existing government, conditions were intolerable;
"no sooner is the merchant prepared for foreign ports, with the
treasures which this new world offers" than he is told that they
are closed against him.137 In Massachusetts, the warning was
sounded that "private merchants will, no doubt, for the sake of
long credit, or some other such temporary advantage, prefer the
ships of foreigners" until such time as the federal government
should be empowered to preserve American shipping for New
England vessels.' 38 As for any fear of oppression of the Southern
states by a navigation act, that was groundless, because of the
potential emigration to the South of Northern merchants and seamen."a ' A bid for rural support sought to identify the interests of
the farmer and the merchant, pointing out the dependence of the
former on the latter for a good price
"and where do you find this? Is it not where trade flourishes, and
when the merchant can freely export the produce of the country... ? When the merchant does not purchase, your produce is
low. . . . You cannot expect many purchases when trade is restricted and your merchants are shut out from nine-tenths of the
ports in the world." 40
Unless the constitution should be adopted, Hamilton urged, the
spirit of enterprise characteristic of American merchants would be
stifled, and we should be confined to a mere passive commerce ;141
this he defined as a "come-and-get-it" type of trade, as distinguished from active commerce, marked by our participation in
the carrying trade.
The emphasis on the relation of the merchant to the carrying
trade, to imports, and to foreign commerce, did not mean that that
was the exclusive activity of merchants. Rather it called attention
to what, although their characteristic, was not their sole function.
137Pamphlets (Randolph) 265.
138 Dawes in the Massachusetts convention, 2 Elliott 58.
139Madison in the federal convention, 2 Farrand (Madison) 451.
14OEssays (Ellsworth) 140, 141.
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Scattered references to mercantile enterprise of a domestic nature,
or at any rate not limited by the context to foreign trade, demonstrate this and indicate the prevailing understanding as to the merchant's place in the national economy.
There seems to be, in the whole course of discussion, only one
instance of a statement confined in its language to domestic trade,
in it the merchant is presented as a person who characteristically
possesses correspondents in other states.1 4 2 In another connection,
where interior commerce was clearly though perhaps not exclusively referred to, the proposition was advanced that "the whole
commerce of the United States may be exclusively carried on by
merchants residing within the seat of government and those places
of arms which may be purchased of the state governments.

'143

The statement clearly envisaged large-scale operations as the merchant's task and correspondingly excluded the processes of local
distribution. Today we tend to lump as merchants nearly all the
intermediate agents in the course of marketing between the producer (or processor) and the consumer, with the retailer as perhaps the archetype. That no such scope attached to the term when
the constitution was formulated is suggested by the reference to
"merchants" and "tradesmen" as independent categories,1 44 and
again by the explicit distinction recognized between local "buying
and selling" and "commerce."' 14 5 To a spokesman of the agricultural South, the merchant was one who found a market elsewhere
for the produce of that section and who produced the inflow to it
of finished goods. 140 To Hamilton, a representative of the quickening industrial life of New York City, "the mechanic and manufacturing arts furnish[ed] the materials of mercantile enterprise and
industry," and the merchant's role was that of "natural patron and
friend" of mechanics and manufacturers.'

47

The merchants, it was said, were well qualified to testify to
the defects in the existing system, under which their "adventures"
14lFederalist, No. 11, 51.
2
14 Wilson in the Pennsylvania convention, McMaster 357 ("At present
how are we circumstanced? Merchants of eminence will tell you that they
can trust their correspondents without law; but they cannot trust the laws of
the state in which their correspondents live.")
143Grayson in the Virginia convention, 3 Elliott 281.
'44See the subscription to the petition of the Rhode Island minority addressed
to the federal convention, 3 Farrand 19.
1405Pamphlets (Jay) 72.
14 Davie in the North Carolina convention, 4 Elliott 20 ("The merenan,
furnishes the planter with such articles as he cannot manufacture, and finds
him a market for his produce.")
147Federalist, No. 35, 167, 168.
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fail. 14s "What prudent merchant," the readers of the Federalist
were asked, "will hazard his fortunes in any new branch of commerce when he knows not but that his plans may be rendered
unlawful before they can be executed?"'1-" On the other hand, if
the proposed union should be formed and the staples of every section made available throughout the whole nation without obstruction, a beneficial stabilization in "the operations of the merchant"
would ensue-an argument the force of which "the speculative
trader will at once perceive." 15° Mercantile adventures, fortunes
hazarded in new branches of commerce, reference interchangeably
to "merchants" and speculative traders. This is hardly language
appropriate to describe the small fry engaged in relatively local or
petty sales activities.
This exhausts the catalogue of instances wherein mention of
merchants or their activities was made. There is controversy over
the grant of monopolies or exclusive privileges to companies of
merchants. There is bracketing of the dealings of merchants and
seamen. There is allusion to the position of merchants in the business of import and export, and to their relations with foreign countries and foreign commerce. There is recognition of the difference
between their status and that of tradesmen, and between commerce
and "buying and selling ;" of their connection with correspondents
in other states; of the possibility of their becoming segregated in a
few centers instead of being dispersed throughout the country.
They are the means by which the surplus manufactures and the
staple agricultural products of the country are marketed, and a
supply of goods not locally produced is introduced into the various
sections of the country. They are "speculative traders" whose
"adventures" are subject to be defeated by the possibility that
their "plans may be rendered unlawful before they can be executed." The aggregate effect of these different allusions is to prick
out a dim but thoroughly consistent pattern of the eighteenth century "merchant" as his contemporaries thought of him. This merchant is the same fellow as he for whom the law merchant and
mercantilist theory of economics were named. His activities conform nicely to those of the present day importer, commission
house, and wholesale firm, with just a dash of the commodity
exchange; they hardly embrace those of the jobber, the hawker,
or the retailer, who to us is the merchant par excellence.
14sWilson in the Pennsylvania convention, McMaster 413.
149Federalist, No. 62 (Hamilton or Madison) 319.
15OFederalist, No. 11 (Hamilton) 53.
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(d) "WiTu FoREIGN NATIoNS, AXD AMONG THE SEVERAL
STATES." These three large classes of subjects-fiscal regulation
as to imports and exports, navigation, "mercantile" enterprisesare the only ones that there is any evidence for believing were
thought of by any one as embraced within "commerce" or affected
by the grant of power to regulate it. They constitute the whole
body of information available for marking the boundaries of the
grant affirmatively, by showing what was understood to be within
it. Other materials aid in fixing those boundaries negatively, by a
disclosure of what was thought not to be included. Before turning
to them, however, it may be worth while to comment on a characteristic common to the three discovered aspects.
Customs and shipping are, even today, and large scale mercantile dealings were, at the time of the formation of the constitution,
subjects characteristically and peculiarly associated with external
dealings, trade with other nations. The insistent recurrence in all
the discussions to matters having this common nucleus suggests
the inference that, in giving Congress power to regulate commerce,
the major concern was with extranational traffic, with only incidental and minor regard to interstate commerce. Such an inference
is amply corroborated.
The technique of using verbal association as an index of psychological connection is again fruitful. Examples abound in which
commerce is spoken of in immediate connection with matters of
purely international significance, such as war, treaties, and the
like, 15' or in which a discussion, purporting to deal with commerce
generally, focuses exclusively on some purely international attribute, consequence, or incident, such as the negotiation or enforcement of commercial treaties.' 5 - Madison's impression of the matter
U'iSee the language in the federal convention of Wilson, 1 Farrand
(Yates) 413, id. (King) 416, and of Madison, id. (Yates) 535; in the
Massachusetts convention of Sam Adams, 2 Elliott 124; in the Virginia
convention of Monroe, 3 id. 213; in the North Carolina convention of Davie,
4 id. 18, and of Maclaine, 4 id. 29; letter of French charg6 d'affaires to
French foreign minister, 3 Farrand 41, of Yates and Lansing to the Governor
of New York, 3 id. 246, and of Randolph to the speaker of the Virginia
house, 1 Elliott 485; Pamphlets (Dickinson) 215; id. (Lee) 287, 301;
Essays (Ellsworth) 153; id. (Winthrop) 79-80; Federalist, No. 41 (Madison) 204; id. No. 53 (Hamilton or Madison) 276. Occasionally the apposition of commerce and foreign trade is made explicitly, e.g., Hamilton's remarks to the New York convention in which he speaks of "the regulation of
commerce--that is, the whole system of foreign intercourse," 2 Elliott 350,
Note the decided emphasis on foreign trade in Hamilton's systematic elaboration5 2of the commerce clause in Federalist, No. 11, 48-53 inclusive.
1 Gorham in the Massachusetts convention, 2 Elliott 106-7 ("How
often, observed the honorable gentleman, has Mr. Adams tried to accomplish
a commercial treaty with England with but feeble power! They prohibit our
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is perhaps indicated by quotation of his notes recording the convention's approval of the commerce clause, "Clause for regulating
commerce with foreign nations &c agreed to nem. con."1 3 This
being nearly a week before there had been any suggestion of incorporating the Indian trade in the clause, the relegation of interstate commerce to an "&c" was rather cavalier treatment if the
power were deemed anywhere nearly as important as that over
the fully specified "foreign commerce."
Reference has already been made to the fact that one of the
evils the commerce clause was avowedly designed to remedy was
the inability of the states to cope separately with the hostile mercantile regulations of foreign powers. 54
The notion is distinctly traceable throughout the discussions
that federal regulation of commerce would bear very differently
on the different states, and even that they could be classified into
commercial and uncommercial states, the former being those with
good and accessible ports and an abundance of ships and seamen,
the latter either the prospective inland states or the existing seaboard states with poor harbor facilities and an undeveloped
marine. r The distinction, predicated on circumstances of prime
oil, fish, lumber, pot and pearl ashes, from being imported into their territories, in order to favor Nova Scotia, for they know we cannot make general
retaliating laws. They have a design in Nova Scotia to rival us in the
fishery, and our situation at present favors their design. From the abundance
of our markets, we could supply them with beef, butter, pork, &c., but they
lay what restrictions on them they please, which they durst not do, were there
an adequate power lodged in the general government to regulate commerce") ; Federalist, No. 12 (Hamilton) 57 ("If, on the contrary, there be
but one government pervading all the states, there will be as to the principal
part of our commerce but ONE side to guard-the ATLANTIC COAST") ;
and see address of dissenting minority of Pennsylvania convention, McMaster
456; Pamphlets (Smith) 107; id. (Lee) 301; id. (Ramsay) 379; Essays
(Ellsworth) 140-1; id. (Williamson) 402; Federalist, No. 4 (Jay) 13-14.
1532 Farrand (Madison) 308.
154
Supra pp. 448, 455.
155 See the remarks in the federal convention of Gerry, 2 Farrand
(Madison) 3, of Sherman, id. 308, of Langdon, id. 360, of Wilson, id. 360,
362, of Gouverneur Morris, id. 442, of C. C. Pinckney, id. 449-450; of
Clymer, id. 450; of Williamson, id. 450-1; of Butler, id. 451 ("He considered
the interest of these (the Southern) and the Eastern states, to be as different as the interests of Russia and Turkey"); of Mason, id. (Madison)
451, (Mason) 640; of Madison, id. (Madison) 451-2, and of Gorham, id.
(Madison) 453; in the New York convention of Hamilton, 2 Elliott 235-6;
in the Virginia convention of Madison, 3 id. 535; in the North Carolina
convention of Davie, 4 id. 120, 238; in the South Carolina legislature of C. C.
Pinckney, 4 id. 284; in the Pennsylvania convention of Findlay, McMaster
770, and of McKean, id. 784 (both as summarized in Wilson's notes) ; and
in the occasional literature, see Martin, Genuine Information; 3 Farrand 200;
letter of Pierce Butler to Weedon Butler, 3 id. 304; letter of 1832, Madison
to Professor Davis, 3 id. 519; letter of Richard Henry Lee to Randolph, 1
Elliott 504, Pamphlets (Mason) 331; id. (Dickinson) 166-7; id. (Lee) 319,
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importance to foreign commerce, in disregard of other variations
between states with regard to inland waterways, convenient land
routes, and other factors of vastly greater significance for interstate commerce, was valid only in so far as commerce was identified with foreign commerce.
In like manner, the division of duties between the proposed
secretary of commerce and finance and the proposed secretary of
domestic affairs, with the former charged with superintendence of
"the commercial interests of the United States" and the latter
vested with oversight of a broad range of internal concerns of the
union, was inconsistent with the notion that commerce impinged
to any considerable extent on purely domestic matters.
True, power to regulate the commerce "with the Indian tribes"
was included in the same clause with that over foreign and interstate commerce; and the Indian trade was almost exclusively an
internal trade. Its presence, however, is of little value as a guide
to what was meant by regulation of commerce in the rest of the
clause. The Indian trade was a special subject with a definite content, which had been within the jurisdiction of congress under the
articles of confederation, although with certain ambiguous qualifications omitted from the constitutional provision. 57 It thus derived
from a totally different branch of the Randolph outline than did
the control over foreign and interstate commerce. Nor was this the
only respect in which they lacked a common origin. They did not
emerge simultaneously as co-ordinated parts of a whole. The provision for regulation of commerce with foreign nations and among
the several states had been published by the committee of detail
two weeks,""5 and definitely approved by the convention two
days,' before the subject of the Indian trade was introduced on
the floor of the convention. 1' 0 It was not until several days later
that the latter was reported out of committee, still encumbered
with some of the qualifications attached to it in the articles ;'6' and
id. (Iredell) 357; id. (Ramsay) 377; Essays (Winthrop) 73, 74, 76-77; id.

(Ellsworth) 194; id. (Clinton) 271-2; id. (Martin) 374; id. (Williamson)
401. See remarks of Wilson in the Pennsylvania convention, McMaster 388
(similar contrast between Philadelphia and the transmontane counties of
Pennsylvania) ; Essays (Winthrop) 70 (characterizing Massachusetts as
"the most commercial state upon the continent.")
'15 Article IX.
1580n August 2, sec 2 Farrand (Madison) 182.
'DOOn August 16, see 2 Farrand (Journal) 304, id. (Madison) 308.
10OBy Madison, on August 18, see 2 Farrand (Journal) 321, id. (Madison) 325.
161 0n August 22, see 2 Farrand (Journal) 366-7, id. (Madison) 375.
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less than two weeks before the close of the convention that it was
finally incorporated with the rest of the commerce clause and approved in the form with which we are familiar.1 2 By this time,
the larger part of the discussion in the federal convention relative
to commercial regulations was over, and in that which did take
place later there is no language relating even remotely to the
Indian trade. In the ensuing extramural discussion, it attracted
little attention, being mentioned only three times :-once in connection with an assertion of usurpation of powers by the congress
under the articles and a warning that excessive fees might be
demanded for licenses to trade with the Indians, 163 once to praise
it for having dropped the ambiguous qualifications annexed to it
in the articles,164 again by an opponent of the constitution in listing
the powers proper to be confided to Congress. 1 5 Whatever regulation of commerce might mean in connection with transactions with
the Indians, it was so distinct and specialized a subject as to afford
no basis for argument as to the meaning of the rest of the clause.
The obvious objection to an interpretation according paramount
importance to the control of external trade is that it seems virtually
to read the phrase "and among the several states" out of the commerce clause. This no mere inferences can be allowed to do, however strongly they may seem to be demanded; for the stubborn fact
is that the language quoted was inserted in the constitution. It cannot be disregarded or dismissed. Some meaning must be assigned
to it. It is, however, legitimate, indeed imperative, in the light of
what has preceded, to inquire what meaning was attached by contemporary opinion to the grant of power as to interstate commerce.
That contemporary opinion is perhaps most distinctly articulated in two non-contemporary statements, issuing some thirtythree and forty-two years, respectively, after the framing of the
constitution from men who had conspicuously participated as delegates in the convention. The first, in a speech by Charles Pinckney
in the House of Representatives, points to the provisions of the
sixth clause of article I, sec. 9, which prescribes uniformity and
impartiality of commercial regulations between the states, as affording the best clue to the meaning of the grant of power over interI 620n September 4, see 2 Farrand (journal) 495, id. (Madison) 499, id.
(McHenry) 503.
' 6 -Essays (Yates) 302-3.
'8 4 Federalist, No. 42, (Madison) 215-6.
165Pamphlets (Lee) 301.
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state commerce.' 66 The other, in a letter written by Madison, explicitly negatives the suggestion that the clause was designed to
have as wide an operation as the companion grant with regard to
foreign commerce, and assigns to it instead merely "a negative and
preventive" function, to control state-created discriminations and
preferences. 1 7 If their statements are to be taken as truly expounding the understanding of the framers and their contemporaries,
there can be little doubt that the major preoccupation was with
foreign trade and that the power over interstate commerce, while
coordinate in expression, was distinctly secondary in scope and
intended operation.
One eminent modern student of the constitution has given
Pinckney and Madison the lie direct, challenging the accuracy of
their recollection as to the purpose of the provisions and asserting
a complete parity of operation for both main branches of the commerce clause. 16 That possibility is certainly not wholly precluded
despite the statements referred to, for, without imputing to Pinckney or Madison any bias affecting their statements, much can be
forgotten in three or four decades of a busy life. The issue can be
resolved only by searching the strictly contemporary records to
see whether they confirm the later recollection of the participants.
lGGAnnals 16th Congress, 1st sess., II, p. 1318, quoted in 3 Farrand 444
("I will only mention here, as it is perfectly within my recollection, that the
power was given to Congress to regulate the commerce by water between
the states, and it being feared, by the Southern, that the Eastern would,
whenever they could, do so to the disadvantage of the Southern states, you
will find, in the 6th [sic] section of the 1st article, Congress are prevented
from taxing exports, or giving preference to the ports of one state over

another, or obliging vessels bound from one state to clear, enter, or pay

duties in another; which restrictions,more clearly than anything else, prove
what the power to regulate commerce among the several states mneans.")
[Italics supplied].

"36Letter of February 13, 1829, to J. C. Cabell, 3 Farrand 478 ("For
a like reason, I made no reference to the 'power to regulate commerce among

the several states.' I always foresaw that difficulties might be started in
relation to that power which could not be fully explained without recurring

to views of it, which, however just, might give birth to specious though

unsound objections. Being in the same terms with the power over foreign
commerce, the same extent, if taken literally, would belong to it. Yet it is
very certain that it grew out of the abuse of the power by the importing
states in taxing the non-importing, and was intended as a negative and
preventive provision against injustice among the states themselves, rather
than as a power to be used for the positive purposes of the general govern-

ment, in which, alone, however, the remedial power could be lodged.")
16sCorwin, The Commerce Power Versus States Rights (1936) Preface,
p. ix ("In 1789 Congress was deemed to have the same power over com-

merce among the states as over that with foreign nations, the same right
to restrain the one as the other for what it thought to be the good of the
country.")
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If they are generally opposed or are conflicting, we may doubt the
explanation even of eyewitnesses. If, however, they are of the
same general tenor and no substantially inconsistent statements
appear, it would seem that the subsequent pronouncements must
be accepted as accurate expositions of the understanding as of the
time the constitution was framed.
The first thing that strikes one's attention in seeking references
directed to interstate commerce is their paucity. When contrasted with the proliferation of statements already cited where
commerce was discussed in a context specifically pointing to
foreign commerce, this in itself might be thought to furnish negative evidence in support of Pinckney and Madison. It would be
unusual if, when two connected subjects, each of great importance,
were simultaneously up for discussion, and if they were regarded
as having co-ordinate consequences, a wealth of consideration
should be devoted to one to the practically complete neglect of
the other. However, it might be possible.
In the convention, control over commerce between the states
seems to have been mentioned only nine times. In three of these
instances, reference was made to the potentialities of the clause
as affording a means of protection against injury inflicted by
hostile or harmful restrictions or regulations of sister states, without intimating what particular type of state commercial regulation was thus to be stricken down.' 690ne of these statements seems
to suggest a distinction as to the effect of federal commercial
action where citizens alone were concerned and where foreigners
were involved, the former being treated as of a negative or restraining character while the latter apparently implied positive
controlling action. 1 70 The other six all refer in like manner to
the anticipated operation of the grant in preventing discriminatory
commercial regulations by states, but mention particular subjects
of legislation as being affected. Twice the restraining effect of
1692 Farrand (Madison) 308 ("Mr. Sherman . . . the oppression of the
uncommercial states was guarded against by the power to regulate trade
between the states. As to compelling foreigners, that might be done by
regulating trade in general." This probably refers to export duties, since it
occurs in a speech dealing with that subject, but of course the language
itself is more general, hence I have not felt justified in pigeonholing it
there) ; id. 360 ("Mr. Ellsworth . . . the power of regulating trade between
the states will protect them against each other. . . ." See editorial note to
the preceding quotation); id. 451-2 ("Mr. Madison . . . observed that the
disadvantage to the S.[outhern] states from a navigation act, lay chiefly in
a temporary rise of freight, attended however with . . . a removal of the
existing
and injurious retaliations among the states on each other.")
170 See statement of Sherman, supra, note 169.
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the grant is mentioned in connection with state export duties. 71
Once it seems to have been involved in an interchange with regard to a state impost on imports.7 2 And it was mentioned once
as to each of the subjects of tolls on the interior waterways,' 1"
inspection fees, 7 4 and compulsory entry and clearance. 7 5 There
is thus not a single occasion in the proceedings of the convention
itself where the grant of power over commerce between the states
was advanced as the basis for independent affirmative regulation
by the federal government. Instead, it was uniformly mentioned
as a device for preventing obstructive or partial regulations by the
states. It is perhaps also worthy of note that, in every instance
(with the possible exception of compulsory entry and clearance),
1712 Farrand (Madison) 360 ("Mr. Govr. Morris . .. there is great
weight in the argument, that the exporting states will tax the produce of
their uncommercial neighbours. The power of regulating the trade between Pa. & N. Jersey will never prevent the former from taxing the latter.
Nor will such a tax force a direct exportation from N. Jersey-the advantages possessed by a large trading city outweigh the disadvantages of
a moderate duty; and will retain the trade in that channel--") ; id. 361
("Mr. M [adison] . ..the regulation of trade between state and state cannot
effect more than indirectly to hinder a state from taxing its own exports:
by authorizing its citizens to carry their commodities freely into a neighbouring state which might decline taxing exports in order to draw into
its channel the trade of its neighbours--").
1722 Farrand (Madison) 441 ("Col. Mason observed that particular
states might wish to encourage by impost duties certain manufactures for
which they enjoyed natural advantages, as Virginia the manufacture of hemp
&c. Mr. Madison-The encouragement of manufacture in that mode requires
duties not only on imports directly from foreign countries, but from the
other states in the Union, which would revive all the mischiefs experienced
from the want of a genl. government over commerce.")
1732 Farrand (McHenry) 504 ("Is it proper to declare all the navigable
waters or rivers and within the United States common high ways? Perhaps
a power to restrain any state from demanding tribute of another state in such
cases is comprehended in the power to regulate trade between state and
state. This to be further considered.")
1742 Farrand (Madison) 588-9 (Mason had moved the insertion of the
clause permitting state inspection fees to pay expenses of inspection. "Mr.
Madison 2ded the motion-It would at least be harmless; and might have the
good effect of restraining the states to bona fide duties for the purpose, as
well as of authorizing explicitly such duties; tho' perhaps the best guard
against an abuse of the power of the states on this subject, was the right
in the genl. government to regulate trade between state and state.")
1752 Farrand (Madison) 418 ("Mr. Carroll & Mr. L. Martin expressed
their apprehensions, and the probable apprehensions of their constituents,
that under the power of regulating trade the general legislature might favor
the ports of particular states by requiring vessels destined to or from other
states to enter & clear thereat, as vessels belonging to Baltimore to enter &
clear at Norfolk &c. . . . Mr. Ghorum thought such a precaution unnecessary." This perhaps comes the closest to an assertion of a power of positive
regulation of any statement in the convention; it is worth noting, however,
that a clause expressly prohibiting such action was passed without opposition, and that Martin at this stage was unusually inclined to imagine dangers
from federal oppression far in excess of the prevailing temper of the convention.)
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where the character of the objectionable state legislation was
spelled out, it consisted of measures of a purely fiscal character.
It is clear that the grant of power to Congress was conceived of as
preventing states from levying tribute on movements in commerce
to and from other states. There is no hint that it meant anything
more. So far as the language of the delegates is concerned, it
accorded uniformly with the subsequent statements of Pinckney
and Madison.
In the hurlyburly of ratification, little attention was paid to the
provision regarding commerce between the several states. One
pamphleteer, in Massachusetts, did indeed suggest its elimination
from the instrument, leaving only the foreign and Indian trade
in the commerce clause.' 76 The conception he entertained of the
clause and his reasons for wishing its removal are somewhat obscure. Professedly he opposed it on the ground that the power
would enable Ccngress to grant mercantile monopolies; but his
evident satisfaction with the superior commercial position of his
home state induces a suspicion that' he may have preferred that
it be allowed to remain in a position to adopt such commercial
regulations as it pleased without let or hindrance. 177 Aside from
this one instance, there was apparently no opposition to the grant
of this particular power, although one Virginia opponent of the
constitution damned it with very faint-and wholly indefinitepraise." 8
Nor was very much made of the clause by its friends, for the
most part. To be sure, there were occasional references to the
chaotic condition of existing commercial relations between the
states, ivhich may perhaps have had some psychological link with
the clause.17 9 Also. there were direct and nasty charges that the
opposition to the constitution in New York was largely attributable to the reluctance of placemen in that state to see the revenues
arising from commercial exactions, ultimately paid by citizens of
neighboring states, slip from their fingers.18 0
Such comments
'7 6Essays (Winthrop) 118 ("Congress shall not have the power of regulating the intercourse between the states ..
") The writer proposed fourteen amendments, this being a part of the second.
177See Essays (Winthrop) 53-109 passim.
'7SGrayson in the Virginia convention, 3 Elliott 280 ("I am willing to
give the government the regulation of trade. It will be serviceable for
regulating the trade among the states. But I believe that it will not be
attended with the advantages generally expected.")
179 See, e.g., the statement of Dawes in the Massachusetts convention, 2
Elliott 57-58.
80
° For the most forthright of these attacks, see Essays (Ellsworth) 176.
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assumed that adoption of the constitution would terminate the
conflicting and prejudicial fiscal burdens imposed by the several
states on each other's commerce, and to this extent are in line
with the sentiments of the framers, as indicated in the records
of the convention and as remembered by Pinckney and Madison.
They are not accompanied, however, by specific reference to the
power over commerce between the states and hence are only of
conjectural value in determining the meaning of that grant. Randolph's expressions are, perhaps, very little more specific, in his
letter to the speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates, in which
he speaks of the general government's acting as mediator of disputes between the states, particularly in disputes over commercial
matters.' 81 Again, Sherman, enumerating the main functions of
the federal government, lists the duties "to preserve . . . a beneficial intercourse among themselves [the states], and to regulate
and protect our commerce with foreign nations."' 3' The language
is interesting; the beneficial intercourse between the states was
merely to be preserved, while foreign commerce was to be not only
protected but also regulated. The innuendo would seem to be
that, in dealings between the states, the federal power was to be
in essence supervisory, much the same sort of a function as the
Randolph statement indicates.
The only thing approaching a full discussion of the power over
interstate commerce is found in the Federalist, where it was
touched on three times, twice by Hamilton and once by Madison.
Both authors alluded to the experience of foreign confederacies,
and specifically of Germany and the Netherlands, as illustrating
the need for such a provision. The references were in both cases
concretely and expressly directed to the prohibitions of internal
tolls and customs contained in the fundamental laws of those
nations.'
Hamilton drove the moral home by a reference to
the "interfering and unneighbourly regulations of some States"
currently existing under the articles, and the threat which they
held for the future peaceful relations of the several states if they
were not eliminated.18 4 In addition to the need for removing
'5 'Pamphlets (Randolph) 267. I Elliott 485-6 ("It follows, too, that
the general government ought to be the supreme arbiter for adjusting every

contention among the states. In all their connections, therefore, with each
other, and particularly in commerce. which will probably create the greatest
discord,2 it ought to hold the reins.")
18 Essays (Sherman).
1Federalist, No. 22 (Hamilton) 103; id. No. 42 (Madison) 215.
5

' 4Federalist, No. 22, 103 ("The interfering and unneighbourly regula-

tions of some states, contrary to the true spirit of the Union, have, in differ-
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these sources of friction, he developed one further argument for
granting the federal government the power to regulate commerce
between the states. Greater stability for commercial enterprise,
and specifically for the export trade, would result, he asserted,
if the produce and resources of each part of the union were
freely accessible to every other part. 8" In this view, foreign
commerce was the primary object of concern, and the regulation
of interstate commerce, that is to say, the unrestricted movement
of commerce within the borders of the United States was desirable as promoting its expansion. Madison professed to supplement the reasoning already given; but his argument consisted only
of a more explicit characterization of the power over interstate
commerce as one needed to render the control of foreign commerce complete and effectual, and an elaborate reiteration of the
necessity of relieving the non-commercial states from oppression
by regulations of the commercial states. 80 Thus, the only reasoned
ent instances, given just cause of umbrage and complaint to others, and it is
to be feared that examples of this nature, if not restrained by a national
control, would be multiplied and extended till they became not less serious
sources of animosity and discord than injurious impediments to the intercourse between the different parts of the confederacy.")
'srFederalist, No. 11, 51-52 ("An unrestrained intercourse between the
states themselves will advance the trade of each by an interchange of their
respective productions, not only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home,
but for exportation to foreign markets. The veins of commerce in every
part will be replenished, and will acquire additional motion and vigor
from a free circulation of the commodities of every part. Commercial enterprise will have much greater scope from the diversity in the productions of
different states. When the staple of one fails from a bad harvest or unproductive crop, it can call to its aid the staple of another. The variety not
less than the value of products for exportation contributes to the activity
of foreign commerce. It can be conducted upon much better terms with a
large number of materials of a given value than with a small number of
materials of the same value; arising from the competitions of trade and
from the fluctuations oi markets.")
1SeFederalist, No. 42, 214-5 ("The defect of power in the existing confederacy to reglate the commerce between its several members is in the
number of those which have been clearly pointed out by experience. To
the proofs and remarks which former papers have brought into view on
this subject, it may be added that, without this supplemental provision, the
great and essential power of regulating foreign commerce, would have been
incomplete and ineffectual. A very material object of this power was the
relief of the states which import and export through other states from the
improper contributions levied on them by the latter. Were these at liberty
to regulate the trade between state and state, it must be foreseen that ways
would be found out to load the articles of import and export, during the
passage through their jurisdiction, with duties which would fall on the
makers of the latter and the consumers of the former. We may be assured by
past experience that such a practise would be introduced by future contrivances; and both by that and a commor knowledge of human affairs,
that it would nourish unceasing animosities and not improbably terminate
in serious interruptions of the public tranquillity.")
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analysis of the power over commerce between the states comes
down to two main propositions. First, state regulations, particularly those of a fiscal nature, were already galling; their removal was essential, as demonstrated by foreign examples and
American sentiment, and should be effected by confiding regulation of commerce to the federal government. Second, power over
interstate commerce was desirable as a collateral power to the
control of foreign commerce, inasmuch as the removal of barriers
to interstate trade erected by state restrictions and exactions would
extend the available commercial resources and so tend to stabilize
mercantile activity. It was recommended as a desirable corrective
of state discrimination and as a useful incidental power in the
promotion of foreign trade.
All the extant contemporary evidence thus tends to confirm
Pinckney's and Madison's recollection that the power as to commerce between the states was in the main a "negative and preventive" provision. It was a shield against state exactions and no
two-edged sword for positive federal attack. To be sure, this
must be modified to include as part of its intended effect a certain ancillary relation in the development of foreign commerce,
which, however, was largely traceable to the removal of state
trade barriers. Furthermore, regulation of the coasting trade
and a measure of control over large-scale mercantile enterprise,
including to some extent interstate trade, was within the purview
of the grant. Still, in substance Pinckney's and Madison's memories seem to have served them faithfully. Despite the formal
parallelism of the grants, there is no tenable reason for believing
that anywhere nearly so large a range of action was given over
commerce "among the several states" as over that "with foreign
nations."
A striking proof of the relatively limited scope of the power
over interstate, as compared -with foreign, commerce is afforded
by one pervading and significant silence. The immunization of
the slave trade from congressional action until 1808, subject to
the right to levy a stated head tax,'8 is in itself so far collateral
that it need not detain us here.188 It is enough to note that the
-s7Constitution of the United States, art. I, sec. 9, cl. 1 ("The migration
or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think
-'proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year
one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on
not exceeding ten dollars for each person.")
such importation,
1 8 The story is briefly told in McLaughlin, Constitutional History of
the United States (1935) 188-190.
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clause was accepted by the delegates as being frankly an exception
to the congressional power over foreign commerce, 180 and that it
was so labelled in subsequent discussion both in and out of the
state ratifying conventions.'
The apprehensions of the Southern
delegates on this score, so far as foreign commerce was concerned,
were so lively as assertedly even to induce extremely unwelcome
concessions on their part. 9 Yet the possibility of federal restraints on the movement of slaves in interstate commerce was not
once mentioned. It was, indeed, a suggestion that Congress had
authority to regulate interstate dealings in slaves which provoked
Pinckney's belated explanation of the limited operation of the
interstate commerce power. No similar suggestion had been
forthcoming at a period coeval with the formation of the constitution. Such deep silence cannot safely be dismissed as accidental.
Some Southerners were ready enough to take alarm at the constitution, and the commerce clause was sectionally unpopular anyway,
so that the argument would hardly have been neglected had it
come to mind. The pertinacity of Southern leaders in safeguarding the foreign slave trade and their utter absence of precautions
with respect to interstate slave traffic are not easily explainable on
any hypothesis other than that of universal concurrence at the time
in the view that the power over interstate commerce was of a
merely preventive-and perhaps somewhat ancillary-character.
(e)

"NOT-COMMERCE"

IN

1787. That the grant of the com-

merce power did not authorize the federal government to assume
control of all matters conditioning the flow of commercial intercourse between the states seems fairly certain. As to some matters, separate special clauses were inserted to permit the exercise
of authority by Congress or to deny it to the states. Others were
recognized as being unaffected by the commerce clause or any
other grants of power to Congress.
Illustrative of the insertion of specific clauses to permit congressional superintendence is the grant of the power to "fix the
Standard of Weights and AMeasures,"' 92 a power which Hamilton
described as in England belonging to the king in his capacity as
189 See, e.g., the statements of Ellsworth, 2 Farrand (Madison) 364, and
of Luther
Martin in the Genuine Information, 3 id. 211.
' 9 oWilson in the Pennsylvania convention, McMaster 312-3; Federalist,
No. 42 (Madison) 213-4. The debate of June 15, 1788, in the Virginia *
convention (see 3 Elliott 454-464) is particularly full on the point, and not
even there was there the slightest hint at the possibility of congressional
restriction
under the power over interstate commerce.
1992'Supra n. 91.
1 Constitution of the United States, art. I, sec. 8, cl.
5.
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"arbiter of commerce."' 9' 3 Even more clearly devised for the
convenience of trade 'were the provisions designed to stabilize the
circulating media of exchange and prevent the avoidance of contractual obligations. The powers given Congress to "coin money,
regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin,' 1 94 and to punish
counterfeiting, 9 5 and the prohibition of state coinage, emission of
bills of credit, legal tender laws, and legislation in impairment of
the obligation of contracts'
were regarded as provisions for
the furtherance of a ready commercial intercourse between the
states and with foreign merchants. 9 7 So, too, the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts was justified as affording a needed
measure of protection for those engaged in carrying on commercial intercourse between the states. 98 The implementation of the
commerce clause in this fashion was a work of supererogation, it
would seem, if the commerce clause itself conferred power to exclude, whether by action or inaction, all hostile and interfering state
action. Occasional reference was made to other subjects similarly
involved in commercial intercourse as not having been affected
by the provisions of the constitution. Gouverneur Morris pointed
to the 'want of power to punish forgeries of commercial paper circulating between the states. "'
Madison. in seconding the clause
1'(3Federalist, No. 69, 356.
1114Constitution of the United States, art. I, sec. 8, cl. 5.

1'9Constitution of the United States, art. I, sec. 8, cl. 6.
316Constitution of the United States, art. I, sec. 10, cl. 2.
1'(Letter of Sherman and Ellsworth to the Governor of Connecticut, 3
Farrand 100 ("The restraint on the legislatures of the several states respecting emitting bills of credit, making anything but money a tender in payment
of debts, or impairing the obligation of contracts by ex post facto laws, was
thought necessary as a security to commerce, in which the interests of
foreigners, as well as of the citizens of different states, may be affected.") ;
McHenry, address to the Maryland legislature, 3 id. 145 (emission of bills
of credit) ; Pamphlets (Ramsay) 374; Federalist, No. 44 (Madison) 227,
228 (coinage, emission of bills of credit) ; Yeates in the Pennsylvania convention (Wilson's notes), 'McMaster 769 (semble) ; see Federalist, No. 69
(Hamilton) 356 (coinage and regulation of foreign coin subject to king as
"arbiter of commerce" in England.)
"1t"Madison in the Virginia convention, 3 Elliott 534, 535 ("Let me
observe that, so far as the judicial power may extend to controversies between citizens of different states, and so far as it gives them power to
correct, by another trial, a verdict obtained by local prejudices, it is favorable
to those states which carry on commerce. There are a number of commercial states which carry on trade for other states. Should the states in
debt to them make unjust regulations, the justice that would be obtained
by the creditors might be merely imaginary and nominal. It might be either
entirely denied, or partially granted") ; Marshall in the Virginia convention,
id. 556 (this is noteworthy as the only time during the progress of the convention when the future Chief Justice made mention of commercial regulation) ; Wilson in the Pennsylvania convention, McMaster 357.
2992 Farrand (Madison) 315.
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conditionally permitting state export duties incidental to inspections, subsumed the continuing power of the states as to inspection laws as qualified, if at all, only to the extent that they involved charges to defray expenses.

20 0

Today we are accustomed to think of the arteries of commerce,
the highways and the inland streams, harbors, bridges, and the
like, as within the ambit of congressional power under the commerce clause. This is not the way the framers of the constitution
looked at the matter.
There was indeed sentiment, at one time, for placing such
channels of intercourse under federal control; but not on the
theory that such control was a part of commercial regulation.
Thus, Randolph in presenting his plan to the convention listed as
one of the blessings which the existing government was incapable
of producing, and which inferentially should be contemplated as
an object of the government to be created, "the establishment
of great national works-the improvement of navigation. ' 20 1 But
this was while the constitution was in an extremely rudimentary
stage, before there was any commerce clause. Again, after that
clause had been blocked out and approved, a proposed addition to
the constitution would have given the federal executive cognizance
of "the opening of roads and navigations and the facilitating
communications throughout the United States ;" but it was to the
secretary of domestic affairs, not to his colleague, the secretary of
commerce and finance, that superintendence of these matters was
202

to be entrusted..

Aside from these early suggestions, neither of which was incorporated in the constitution, the discussions uniformly assumed
that control over such transportation facilities was to remain with
the states, and not to be devolved upon the general government.
No more was claimed for the commerce clause than that it might
prevent states through which interstate streams ran from levying
toll for their use.203 Regulation and preservation of harbours,
their deepening and improvement, and the installation and marking
of buoys were understood to remain with the states; indeed, it was
to provide a revenue for these purposes that the states were con2002 Farrand (Madison) 588-9.
2011 Farrand (McHenry) 25-26.
2022 Farrand 335-6. The other specific objects to be entrusted to the
secretary of domestic affairs, namely, "matters of general police" and "the
state of agriculture and manufactures" rather definitely indicate that the
matter of transportation facilities within the country was regarded as a head
of internal governmental power.
2O3See 2 Farrand (McHenry) 504.
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ditionally authorized to exact tonnage duties. 20 4 The appointment
of port wardens was spoken of as a continuing power of the
several states.205 Opponents of the constitution, speaking scoffingly of the restricted range of powers still to be left with the
states, listed in that category the control over roads, 200 bridges, 207
and ferries. 2 0 8

Its advocates recognized that those subjects would

be for the states to handle,2-0 contending, however, that they were
but a small section of the very extensive field where state legislative jurisdiction would continue unabated.
It may be thought, from the generality of the terms employed,
that these statements related only to intrastate roads, bridges, and
ferries, of no substantial importance as avenues of interstate communication. Any such supposition is distinctly negatived by the
debate attending Franklin's unsuccessful attempt to bestow on
Congress the power of constructing canals.1 0 Proponents of that
amendment made clear that it was aimed at providing authority
for establishing facilities of interstate intercourse and at preventing state obstruction of the general welfare in this connection. It was rejected by a vote of eight states to three. The
defeat of the motion was thenceforth understood as meaning that
the federal government was to have no jurisdiction over the canal
system, whatever the degree to which the national inter-communication might be involved.2 -1 ' The decision is of peculiar interest
20
4See 2 Farrand (McHenry) 504, 634.
20oPamphlets
(Coxe) 152.
00
" See the remarks of Henry in the Virginia convention, 3 Elliott 171;
and of Lowndes in the South Carolina legislature, 4 id. 287.
-OTHenry in the Virginia convention, supra, note 206.
-l°sLowndes in the South Carolina legislature, supra, note 206.
-0'Livingston in the New York convention, 2 Elliott 384; Pendleton in
the Virginia convention, 3 id. 301.
21r12 Farrand (Madison) 615-6.
-"Letter of Madison to Chapman in 1831, 3 Farrand 494-5 ("Perhaps
I ought not to omit the remark, that although I concur in the defect of
powers in Congress on the subject of internal improvements, my abstract
opinion has been, that, in the case of canals particularly, the power would
have been properly vested in Congress. It was more than once proposed in
the Convention, of 1787, and rejected from an apprehension, chiefly, that it
might prove an obstacle to the adoption of the constitution. Such an addition to the federal powers was thought to be strongly recommended by
several considerations: 1. As Congress would possess, exclusively, the
sources of revenue most productive and least unpopular, that body ought to
provide and apply the means for the greatest and most costly works. 2.
There would be cases where canals would be highly important in a national
view, and not so in a local view. 3. Cases where, though highly important in
a national view, they might violate the interest, real or supposed, of the
state through which they would pass, of which an example might now be
cited in the Chesapeake and Delaware canal, known to have been viewed
in an unfavourable light, by the state of Delaware. 4. There might be
cases where canals, or a chain of canals, would pass through sundry states,
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since the canals were, for that era, the nearest equivalent of the
railroads of a later age. Moreover, exclusion of the federal
government from jurisdiction over the land and water routes
within the country was not confined to the case of canals. An
attempt by Madison to broaden the proposed canal amendments
so that Congress might be able "to secure an easy communication between the States which the free intercourse now to be
opened, seemed to call for,

2 -1

2

without limitation to a particular

mode, met with so little support that it was withdrawn without
the taking of a record vote.
In any event, it was not the commerce clause which was
thought of as related to the control of interstate highways and
channels of communication, but rather that of establishing post
offices and post roads. It was the latter that Franklin's proposed
amendment was designed to supplement; and, in the only instance
during the course of ratification where any apprehension was expressed lest the federal government might undertake to act in this
field, the fear was expressly grounded on the postal clause, with
no mention of the commerce clause. 212
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. For the first thirty years of its
life the commerce clause was lost in silence, and since then it has
been lost in words. It has not been missed, however, for the
courts have supplied a fine large substitute; whereas the original
now turns out to have been so small that it was naturally hard to
keep track of.
Really, it was hardly more than a provision about a specialized
aspect of foreign affairs. True, Congress was empowered to
regulate commerce "between the several states" as well as that
"with foreign nations." But the added grant, aside from its
purely negative function of vetoing state-imposed barriers (and
specifically fiscal barriers) to interstate trade, was substantially
and create a channel and outlet for their foreign commerce, forming at the
same time a ligament for the Union, and extending the profitable intercourse
of its members, and yet be of hopeless attainment if left to the limited
faculties and joint exertions of the states possessing the authority") ; same
to Edward Livingston in 1824, id. 463; Hamilton's advice to Washington on
the constitutionality of a national bank, id. 364.
2122

21

Farrand (Madison) 615.

3Proceedings in the New York convention, 2 Elliott 406 ("To the
clause respecting the establishment of post-offices, &c., Mr. Jones moved
the following amendment :--"Resolved, as the opinion of the committee, that
the power of Congress to establish post-offices and post-roads is not to
be construed to extend to the laying out, making, altering, or repairing
highways, in any state, without the consent of the legislature of such state.")

THE C01MMERCE CLAUSE

an individualized "necessary and proper" clause in aid of the
power over external commerce.
The commerce power that the courts have given Congress is
a rather formidable creation of indefinite extent which federalizes,
so to speak, whatever it touches. The earlier one, that the constitution gave, was a mild, modest little power, confined to three
tolerably concrete heads of jurisdiction-customs and fiscal regulation, navigation and maritime affairs, the conduct of large scale
mercantile enterprise. Peripheral matters-the routes and channels of internal communication, internal police regulations determinative of whether and on what conditions articles of commerce
might move between state and state, the establishment of a trustworthy medium of exchange-might be ever so intimately connected with commerce, but they were not commerce, and Congress had no power over them under, or by implication from, the
commerce clause.
The constitution, like most other documents, was written not
so much in the language of divination as in that of experience.
Regulation of commerce-why, only yesterday parliament and
the board of trade had been exercising the power of regulating
the commerce of the colonies. That recollection lingered ;214 and
may not one surmise that men were looking to that model, rather
than to the dictionary or the as yet unwritten opinions of the as
yet unappointed great chief justice in settling the ambit of congressional power?
THE GRANT TO CONGRESS AS A WITHDRAWAL FROM THE STATES

The content of the legislative jurisdiction intended to be
given the federal government was only part of the picture. An
equally significant part was the consequences upon the action
of the states. Had the issue been clearly posed and unequivocally
settled, it might perhaps have eliminated decades of judicial groping and guessing; and on the other hand it might have broken up
the convention. At any rate it was not.
At the start of the convention, a few of the delegates-Read
of Delaware,2 1 Gouverneur Morris,216 Butler of South Carolina
-'4Letter of 1833, Madison to Rives, 3 Farrand 522; Essays (Winthrop)
97; cf. Pamphlets (Coxe) 136.
21

5See 1 Farrand (Madison) 136, 202, id. (Yates) 141, 206, id. (King)

143.

21-See

I Farrand (Paterson) 556.
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(if his views as to representation should prevail, which they did
not) 127 and notably Alexander Hamilton- 2 8 were quite ready
to abolish the state governments entirely, at least as states, although
Hamilton at least conceded that they would probably have to be
retained as municipal corporations with subordinate power to enact ordinances. 219 Another small group, represented by Sherman
and Luther Martin, conceived of the general government as "a
sort of collateral government" to "secure the states in particular
difficulties, ' 220 a government "to protect and secure the state governments," empowered to act on anything of "an external and
merely general nature," with the states retaining their authority
undiminished as to "whatever is internal and existing between
the separate states and individuals.1 221 While neither of these opposing views was directly responsive to the question whether the
grant of power to the federal government constituted a displacement of state authority in the fields designated, they both disclosed the existence of sympathies capable, if occasion should arise,
of leading to a resolution of that shadowy problem-the first
against, the second in favor of, the continued existence of power
in the states despite the grant to Congress.
These views were in any event extreme and atypical. The
more prevalent attitude might be phrased metaphorically, as by
Dickinson in comparing the national government to the solar system with the states as planets revolving in their more or less independent orbits. 222 It was grounded in solid practical considerations. The "great extent" of the country rendered it essential
that a substantial share of authority remain in the state governments. 22 3 The states had different interests from each other and
were ignorant of each other's interests. 224 The "great variety of
2
17See 1 Farrand (King) 144.
2
I8Hamilton occupied almost the entire session of June 18 with an address urging the abolition of the states, except as organs for local legislation

subject to supervision and veto by governors appointable by the federal
executive,
see 1 Farrand 281-311.
2
X9See 1 Farrand (Madison) 323.
-22SO characterized by Sherman, see 1 Farrand (King) 142, 143.
22
"The language is that of Martin. 1 Farrand (Yates) 439, id. (King)
442; cf. id. (Madison) 437.

2221 Farrand (Madison) 153, id. (King) 159. This fancy seems to have
caught the imagination of several of his colleagues, see Wilson's remarks,
id. (Madison) 153, 154, and those of Madison, id. (Madison) 165, id.
(Yates) 169.
223This consideration was mentioned by Wilson, 1 Farrand (Madison)

154, 224
and by Madison, id. (Madison) 357.
See Gerry's remarks, 1 Farrand (Madison)

166. The diversity and
even divergence of interests between the states was also stressed by Bedford, 1 Farrand (Madison) 167, id. (Yates) 170, id. (King) 172.
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objects" of governmental concern at one place and another in
the several states precluded universal central control.2 25 In short,
there was a lively awareness of the need for autonomous solution of special problems not common to all the people and territory to be governed, of that diversity in unity which is the basic
predicate of federalism.
The character of the matters which the states could more
appropriately handle, and as to which it would accordingly be
wise to leave their authority unimpaired, was similarly a matter
on which the delegates were in substantial agreement. While
Randolph in the initial stages of the convention had listed as subjects with reference to which the existing government was incapable of producing "certain blessings," and which inferentially
would fall within the proposed congressional power to legislate
wherever the separate states were "incompetent," "the establishment of great national works-the improvement of inland
navigation-agriculture-manufactures-a freer intercourse among
the citizens," 2"0 and Hamilton had specified as the "three great
objects of government," which could be secured only by a national government, "agriculture, commerce, and revenue," 28
these were isolated instances of specification of matters susceptible of federal control. The prevailing tendency here, as with
respect to the grant of powers to the federal government, was to
resort to characterization rather than specification. True, it was
not very enlightening to describe the appropriate sphere for state
action in terms of "subordinate" matters, 223 or of "laws that
were connected with the states themselves.

' 229

On the other hand,

the recurrent references to the states' powers in terms of "local"
objects or concerns, 230 and of control of their "internal police,"'2 31
-25Referred to by Madison, 1 Farrand (Madison) 357, by Luther
Martin, 4 id. 25; and see the brief notation of an objection by Mason, 1
Farrand (Hamilton) 160.
:261 Farrand (McHenry) 27.
2271 Farrand (Yates)
329.
228See the remarks of Wilson, 1 Farrand (Madison) 153, 154, id.
(Yates) 328; of Hamilton, id. (Madison) 323, of King, id. (Madison)
492, and of Madison, id. (Madison) 357. Cf. Wilson's remarks at id.
(King) 416 ("Certain inferior qualities . . . are the province" of the
states.)9
2 Sherman's expression, see 1 Farrand (Pierce) 60.
2 0
-° The epithet appears to have been used by Wilson, see 1 Farrand
(Yates) 157, id. (Madison) 167; by Williamson, see id. (King) 171; by
Luther Martin, see id. (Yates) 439; and by Baldwin, see id. (Madison)
470. Cf. Lansing's remarks on the Randolph plan as leaving with the states
jurisdiction only over "the little local objects . . . which are not objects
worthy
of the supreme cognizance." id. (Madison) 249.
2 1
3 For the use of substantially this terminology to characterize the
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did furnish a line of demarcation. The principle was clear enough.
Federal and state legislative jurisdiction were to be complementary
each of the other, the former extending to general or national
cases or concerns, the latter to matters of local concern, matters
which were nearly connected with the internal peace, order, and
good government. As was to become apparent when their handiwork later came to be applied, this was one of those "general
propositions (which) do not decide concrete cases. ' 23 2 The possibility of subjects which were in one aspect national or general,
in another local, a matter of internal police, seems not to have
presented itself to the minds of the framers and it pretty clearly
did not get presented on the floor of the convention. Still, while
they had not laid down a formula for the decision of particular
cases, they had proclaimed a standard which might afford guidance if it were utilized. The- rejection of Sherman's proposed
amendment adding to the grant of legislative power, in matters
which concerned the common interests of the union, a caveat
against interference with the internal police of the several states 233
can hardly be taken as outweighing the evidences set forth as
to the assumptions regarding the power left in the states. Rather
it would seem to have been regarded as in part redundant and
unnecessary, and in part an improper stressing, in a section dealing with the powers granted to Congress, of the different though
related subject as to the powers to be left in the states.
At best, however, this national-local dichotomy constituted,
in so far as state powers were concerned, a policy or standard
as to the general extent of state jurisdiction. It did not go to
the question whether the particular powers to be given the federal
government were regarded by the framers as wholly withdrawn
powers contemplated as remaining with the states, see the statements accredited to Wilson, 1 Farrand (Yates) 157, id. (King) 416; to Randolph,
2 id. (Madison) 26; to Williamson, 1 id. (Madison) 165, id. (King) 416;
to Luther Martin, 1 id. (Yates) 439; and to Ellsworth, id. (Madison)
492. Cf. the choleric objection of Gouverneur Morris to Sherman's proposed amendment, 2 id. (Madison) 25 ("The internal police, as it would
be called & understood by the states ought to be infringed in many cases,
as in the case of paper money & other tricks by which citizens of other
states may be affected.") ; also Madison's argument for a broad veto
power in the federal government based on the asserted defects in the
legislative system of the states, and the appropriateness of the power of
the negative to "secure a good internal legislation and administration to
the particular states," 1 id. (Madison) 318.
22
3 H-olmes, J., in Lochner v. New York, (1905) 198 U. S. 45, 76, 25
Sup. 2 Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937.
3Supra text and note 24.
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from the ambit of state action, or whether they were deemed to
remain in whole or in part with the states.
On this question, the proceedings in the early stages of the
convention afford some, although rather meager and to an extent
conflicting, evidence. When, at the very outset and without discussion, the committee of the whole approved the resolution to give
the federal legislature "the legislative rights vested in Congress
by the confederation, '

23 4

a provision subsequently referred by the

convention proper to the committee of detail with similar unanimity, it is fair to think that it intended to bestow not only the same
heads of power as the congress of the confederation had, but
powers possessing the same qualities or attributes. Limited though
the number of such powers was, the terms of the grant in the
articles had been that Congress should have "the sole and exclusive right and power" of acting as to the specified subjects. 235
While it might be argued that the omission of like terminology
from the legislative jurisdiction conferred by the constitution as
it finally emerged represented a deliberate decision against giving authority to Congress in exclusion of the states, it would
seem more probable that the convention, acting in awareness of
the terms of the article and specifically directing the continuation
of the powers therein conferred, intended, at least as to that class
of matters, to make no substantial alteration in the location of
legislative jurisdiction over the included subjects. Since those
powers were interspersed through and, in some instances, such
as the inclusion of the control over trade with the Indians in
the commerce clause, even incorporated with the newly granted
powers, it may similarly be supposed that it intended the latter
to possess the same quality of exclusiveness, in the absence of
differentiating language.
Much of what little light there is was shed by the discussions as to giving the central government a negative over state
acts. While in general that important controversy lies outside the
purview of our consideration, a brief statement of it is necessary.
The Randolph plan had proposed giving the national legislature
a veto power over state laws in its opinion "contravening . . .
the articles of Union. 2 3 8 This was amended, on Franklin's mo-

tion, to extend the power to laws in contravention of "any treaties
113Supra text and note 3.
2-'Articles of Confederation, article IX.
2"OSupra text and note 3.
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subsisting under the authority of the union,

' 23 7

and in that form

adopted by the committee of the whole. When it came before the
convention for final action, Pinckney proposed and Madison supported a substitute provision, giving the federal government the
negative as to "all laws which to them shall appear improper,"
without limitation as in the Randolph-Franklin clause to situations
of repugnancy.238 The amendment was defeated decisively. Thereafter the Paterson plan was presented, totally omitting provisions
for a negative on state legislation and thus differing markedly
from that of Randolph, as Wilson pointed out in his parallel analysis of the two. 230

The decision to adhere to the Randolph plan con-

stituted a decision to retain the negative, just as the rejection of
the Pinckney substitute had been an election of a limited, as
against an unlimited, negative. All of this took place before the
supremacy clause was included in the framework of the constitution, and-significantly, in view of the ardent sponsorship of the
negative mainly by representatives of the larger states-before
the compromise on equal representation in the senate. The day
after that arrangement was announced, the provisions regarding
the negative came up for consideration in their due order by the
convention, to determine whether the clause should be referred
to the committee of detail. The motion to refer was defeated by
a vote of seven to three. 240 By this time, however, the theory which
was to find expression in the supremacy clause was taking shape;
and when shortly thereafter the substance of that clause was
moved for adoption by Luther Martin, it found lodgement in the
constitution in place of the now-abandoned provision for a congressional negative.
All during this running controversy, there were intermittent
casual remarks tending to shed light on the conceptions entertained by the framers as to the province left open for state legislation under the new system. Dickinson was firmly convinced that
no boundary could be fixed between the legislative jurisdiction of
2 41
states and nation, hence the unlimited negative should be given.
Farrand (Journal) 47.
2381 Farrand (Journal) 162, id. (Madison) 164; id. (Yates) 169.
239See 1 Farrand (Wilson) 277. id. (Madison) 252, id. (Yates) 260;
id. (King) 265, id. (Hamilton) 269.
2402 Farrand (Journal) 22. A renewed attempt to introduce the federal
negative, confined to laws "interfering .. .with the general interests and
harmony of the Union," upon a two-thirds vote by Congress, was brought
forward and defeated in the closing weeks of the convention, id. (Journal)
382.
2411 Farrand (Madison) 167, id. (King) 172.
2371
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Since the side of the boundary which would be protected by such
a measure was that of the federal power, he seems to have assumed that the states could and would legislate on matters falling
within the scope of the federal grant, and to have been willing to
confide in the restraining action of the national legislature rather
than in any inherent want of power as the means of opposing such
enactments. Others of the delegates advanced similar notions when
it suited their convenience for purposes of argument ;242 but since
some, at least, who did so, on other occasions took the exactly
contrary position, that the line was susceptible of definition, 243 no

great weight can be attached to their declarations. Luther Martin
stated more positively that the respective jurisdictions of state and
nation were capable of delimitation; in his remarks, the assumption that state action within the carefully defined limits of power
bestowed on the federal government would constitute a prohibited
trespass on the latter's jurisdiction, and vice versa, lay very close
to the surface. '
These are dangerous materials on which to rely, however,
since the statements were all made while their proponents were in
passionate pursuit of a controverted point. More revealing are
the incidental expressions employed in the general course of discussion. Thus, Butler spoke with apprehension of "taking away
the rights of the states," when discussing the scope of the Randolph-plan grant of power to the federal legislature. 245 King, on
the same topic, described that grant as having to do with the
' 246
power "given up by the people . .. to the federal government.
Wilson spoke of the states as being "restrained" to local purposes.*'47 Lansing declared that the Randolph plan "absorbs" the

powers of the states save in certain municipal affairs of negligible
importance.A'-fl King again, in supporting the Randolph plan, while
disclaiming any desire to obliterate the states, "thought that much
-' Sce the remarks of Pinckney, I Farrand (Madison) 164; of Wilson,
id. (Madison) 166; of Madison, id. (Yates) 169; of Hamilton, id. (Madison)
323; and of Sherman, 2 id. (Madison) 25.
"'Compare the arguments of Wilson, 1 Farrand (King) 416, with
thoe cited supra n. 242.
"'1 Farrand (Yates) 439 ("'Many who wish the general government
to protect the state governments are anxious to have the line of jurisdiction well-drawn and defined, so that they may not clash. This suggcsts the necessity of having this line well detailed-possibly this may be
done.")
1115Farrand (Madison) 53.
2114 Farrand (Pierce) 60.
2,11 Farrand (Madison) 137.
- 1 Farrand (Madison) 249.
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of their power ought to be taken from them." 249 Sherman observed on the difficulty of specifying the line between the powers
to be given the general government and "those to be left with
the states."250 Gouverneur Morris regarded the existence of a
federal negative over state laws as unnecessary "if sufficient
2 1
Legislative authority should be given to the genl. government.I 5
Concededly, each of these statements is in itself a trifle. Their
significance lies in the uniformity of their tendency, rather than
in the intrinsic strength of any single expression. They are straws
which show which way the ideological wind was blowing. Surrender, limitation, reduction of state powers, that is the common
suggestion in all these snatches of language unguardedly employed
without deliberate purpose of stating an argument. Examination
of the records in this early stage discloses not a single instance of
the use of words containing a counter-suggestion that fields of
action were being opened up in which either Congress or the
states, in appropriate circumstances, might legislate. Considered
together with the grant of power as to subjects of congressional
action under the articles, perhaps also with the fact that the proposed federal negative extended only to state laws contravening
the "articles of union" and treaties, and not like the supremacy
clause to vindicate the dignity of the federal Constitution, laws,
and treaties, the united effect of these collateral expressions demonstrates, it is submitted, that the delegates were thinking in terms
of grants of jurisdiction to the federal government which would
2 52
exclude state power on the same subjects.
Upon the submission of the constitution to the people, this undertone of harmony disappeared. In some quarters, the discussion still proceeded on the basis that there was no overlapping of
jurisdiction. The picture drawn was that of a groupihg of powers
into mutually exclusive categories, the one composed of those matters as to which authority was to be conferred on the general gov2491 Farand (Madison) 324.
2502 Farrand (Madison) 25.
2512 Farrand (Madison) 27.

25 2
The same thought seems to underlie the interchange between Gerry
and Pinckney in discussing the proposed unlimited veto power (see 1
Farrand (Yates) 170), specifically in its application to existing state legislation, in which after the former had expressed his opinion that the
power of the negative would probably apply to such laws and that consequently the limited negative would seem preferable, the latter rejoined
that "the proposed amendment had no retrospect to the state laws already
made. The adoption of the new government must operate as a complete
repeal of all the constitutions and state laws, so far as they are inconsistent with the new government."
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ernment, the other of matters as to which authority should remain with the states. 2 3 This was, in effect, a reiteration of the
early views just examined as to the scope and scheme of the new
government.
Another view of quite the contrary tenor was also being expressed, however. Of this, perhaps the best exemplar is Hamilton's celebrated analysis in the thirty-second number of the
Federalist. There he said:
* As the plan of the convention aims only at a partial union
or consolidation, the state governments would clearly retain all
the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were
not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United States. This
exclusive delegation, or rather this alienation, of state sovereignty,
would only exist in three cases; where the constitution in express
terms granted an exclusive authority to the Union; where it
granted in one instance an authority to the Union, and in another
prohibited the States from exercising the like authority; and where
it granted an authority to the Union, to which a similar authority
in the States would be absolutely and totally contradictory and
repugnant. I use these terms to distinguish this last case from
another which might appear to resemble it, but which would, in
fact, be essentially different; I mean where the exercise of a concurrent jurisdiction might be productive of occasional interferences
in the policy of any branch of administration, but would not imply
any direct25 4contradiction of repugnancy in point of constitutional
authority.
A similar sentiment was expressed by the same writer on another
occasion,255 and the same approach was taken by two pro-constitution delegates in the Virginia ratifying convention, of whom one
was the young John Marshall. " ' Here, then, is plain conflict,
2-aLetter of Sherman and Ellsworth to the governor of Connecticut,
3 Farrand 99 ("Some additional powers are vested in congress, which was
a principal object that the states had in view in appointing the convention. Those powers extend only to matters respecting the common interests
of the union, and are specially defined, so that the particular states retain
their sovereignty in all other matters.") ; letter of October 24, 1787,
Madison to Jefferson, id. 132 ("The great objects which presented themselves were . . . 2. to draw a line of demarkation which would give

to the general government every power requisite for general purposes,
and leave to the states every power which might be most beneficially ad-

ministered by them. . ."): Essays (Sherman) ("The powers vested in
the federal government are clearly defined, so that each state still retains
its sovereignty in what concerns its own internal government, and a right
to exercise every power of a sovereign state not particularly delegated to
the government of the United States. The new powers vested in the
United
(Italics supplied.)
25 States are, to regulate commerce (etc.) . . .")
4At p. 152.
5
"-'Federalist, No. 82, 420.
2S'Nicholas, 3 Elliott 391; Marshall, id. 419 ("The truth is, that when
power is given to the general legislature, if it was in the state legislature
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with the greater number of statements on the one side, and the
greater articulateness of statement on the other.
The question of exclusiveness or concurrency of state and federal powers in general is difficult of resolution, but happily we
need not resolve it. Hamilton was addressing his remarks to the
questions of taxation and of the jurisdiction of the federal courts,
while the Virginians were discussing control of the militia. Even
should their analysis be accepted and the statements opposed to
it rejected, there remains the question whether "authority in the
states" to regulate commerce "would be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant" to the grant of the commercial power
to Congress.
Sherman, at least, seems to have thought the contrary, with
his declarations on one occasion in the convention that "the states
' 7
will never give up all power over trade,SS
on another that the
supremacy clause would render the existence of a concurrent
power in the states harmless. 2

8

These statements are difficult to

reconcile, however, with his commitments to the general proposition that the areas of state and federal action were mutually exclusive3 9 Bedford in the early days of the convention was astute
to preserve to the states some measure of autonomous action with
respect to matters affecting their commercial interests. 261 It seems
likely from the context of his remarks, however, that he contembefore, both shall exercise it; unless there be an incompatibility in the exercise by one to that by the other, or negative words precluding the state
government.") See also Pamphlets (Hanson) 251, suggesting that the
only limitations on state action are those expressed in art. I, sec. 10.
2572 Farrand (Madison) 361.
2582 Farrand (Madison) 625 ("Mr. Sherman. The power of the United
States to regulate trade being supreme can control interferences of the
state regulations when such interferences happen; so that there is no danger
to be25apprehended from a concurrent jurisdiction.")
9Supra, note 253.
26OHis statements were made prior to the particularization of the
broad powers given by the Randolph plan, and hence prior to the commerce
clause, so that they cannot be regarded as addressed directly to that
grant. They occurred in the course of the discussion of the proposed federal
negative on state laws which he then opposed. He is quoted somewhat differently in the three versions of his address and the relevant portions
of each account are here set out.

".

.

. Delaware would have about 1/90

for its share in the general councils, whilst Pa. & Va. would possess 1/3
of the whole. Is there no difference of interests, no rivalship of commerce, of manufacturers? Will not these large states crush the small ones
whenever they stand in the way of their ambitious or interested views?
This shows the impossibility of adopting such a system as that on the
table .

.

. ." 1 Farrand (Madison)

165. "Mr. Bedford was against the

motion, and states the proportion of the intended representation 90: Delaware I-Pennsylvania and Virginia one third. On this computation where
is the weight of the small states when the interest of the one is in competition with the other on trade, manufactures, and agriculture?," id.
(Yates) 170. "When the system of equal representation obtains Delaware
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plated only the retention of independent power to encourage local
industries by bounties and similar devices, 26 a view which was
shared by a number of his colleagues, -62 although as strenuously
resisted by others.2 3

If that is the interpretation to be given his

remarks, they are, of course, beside the point, because they do
not refer to anything within the bounds of "commerce," as that
term was understood in connection with the grant to Congress.
Except for these distinctly dubious instances, there is no evidence
that any one desired or expected that the states would retain any
authority so far as the specific subject of regulation of commerce
was concerned.
The statements scattered throughout the course of the discussion to the effect that, as to commercial regulation, Congress would
or should be given "full power, 2 6 4 "absolute control,"2 65 and the

like 2 1 look in the opposite direction. Still, they are too ambiguous to support without more the proposition that Congress and
Congress alone should have the power of commercial regulation,
being on their face equally susceptible to the construction that
there should be no aspect of commercial regulation withheld from
the federal government.
Some at least of the delegates seem to have gone to Philadelphia firmly committed to the project of securing for the general
government the entire regulation of commerce, depriving the
states of all participation in that field.2 67 In accordance with this
will be 1/90th-Virginia and Pennsylvania will stand 28/90th-Suppose a
rivalry in commerce or manufactures between Delaware and these two
states; what chance has Delaware agt. them? Bounties may be given in
Virginia & Pennsylvania, and their influence in the genl. govt. or legislature will prevent a negative, not so if the same measure is attempted in
Delaware,"
id. (King) 172.
2
OSee supra, note 260.
28
2See statements of Gerry, 1 Farrand (King) 171-2; of Mason, 2 id.

(Madison)
441; and of Clymer and King, 2 id. (Madison) 442.
6

" 3See, e.g., Madison's remarks at 2 Farrand (Madison) 441.
"'ASee, e.g., the language of the Rhode Island merchants' address
to the
convention, 3 Farrand 19.
26
rMonroe in the Virginia convention, 3 Elliott 214; McMaster (Cen-

tinel) 570.

"o0JE.g., letter of Carrington to Jefferson, 3 Farrand 38 ("full and
independent authority"); Pinckney in the Observations on the Plan of
Government, 3 id. 116; Essays (Winthrop) 108 ("unlimited power"); see
address of the minority of the Pennsylvania legislature, McMaster 79
("entire
jurisdiction over maritime affairs.")
2
13Letter of French charge d'affaires to the French foreign minister,
June 10, 1787, 3 Farrand 41, 42 ("Les Etats seront surtout priv6s de la
facult6 de faire aucun r6glement de commerce ou de statuer sur aucun
object relatif au droit des gens et le Congres se reservera exclusivement
cette branche de legislation.... Les d6put s, Monseigneur, qui m'ont communiqu6 ces diff~rens projets, sont d6termin6s A les soutenir avec vigueur
dans l'assemble de Philadelphie. . . .")
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purpose, the Pinckney plan expressly proposed to give Congress
the "exclusive" power to regulate trade; -68 and similar language appears in 'the draft prepared by Wilson as a member of
the committee on detail.269 Its absence from the constitution as
ultimately presented for approval is more probably to be ascribed
to a feeling that insertion was unnecessary than to any alteration
in the purpose of the delegates. Madison's declaration, in the
closing days of the convention, that he "was more and more convinced that the regulation of Commerce was in its nature indivisible and ought to be wholly under one authority,"270 is the
most unequivocal expression in support of the doctrine of exclusiveness after the constitution had assumed its final form. Others,
however, went on record to the effect that the federal government
ought in the general interest to have the sole say-so in the field of
commercial regulation.2 7 1 Still others, without committing themselves to what should be done, did register their opinion that the2
27
states were in fact surrendering the entire leld to Congress.
Moreover, there was fairly widespread expression of the view that
the states were incompetent to legislate in the field, whether because their action would be ineffectual or because it would not be
disinterested. 2 7 3 That those holding this latter opinion, all of them

partisans of the constitution, were not contemplating the retention
of the power by a body not qualified to exercise it seems a legitimate inference; hence, it seems fair to group them with those
who interpreted the constitution as withdrawing all power over
commerce from the states.
26s2 Farrand 135; 3 id. 607.
2692 Farrand 159.

Farrand (Madison) 625.
Langdon objected to giving the states any power with respect to
regulation of tonnage, on the ground that it "was an essential part of the
regulation of trade, and that the states ought to have nothing to do with
it." (loc. cit. supra, n. 270). In the Observations on the Plan of Government, Pinckney adverted to the good fiscal consequences to be anticipated
from "the surrendering to the Federal Government, the complete management of our commerce." (3 Farrand 116). See Pamphlets (Lee) 287, for
an instance where a warm opponent of the constitution nevertheless supported 2 the grant of exclusive commercial power.
27 Tyler in the Virginia convention, 3 Elliott 639; Lowndes in the
South Carolina legislature, 4 id. 273 (semble). Essays (Winthrop) 79,
lists, as one of the two major items of complaint against the confederation,
"that Congress has not the sole power to regulate the intercourse between
us and foreigners," and seems to assume that it is granted power of that
character by the constitution.
2
73See the remarks of Livingston
in the New York convention, 2
Elliott 214, 384; of Yeates in the Pennsylvania convention, McMaster 297;
Essays (Ellsworth) 141.
2702
27
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Two other bits of evidence tend to corroborate the view that
the convention intended, in granting the commerce power to Congress, to exclude the states from legislating upon the subjects included under it. One, of course, is the inclusion of the power over
Indian commerce in the same clause and in like language. This,
it will be recalled, was a power substantially equivalent to one
possessed by congress under the articles of confederation and,
like other powers conferred by that instrument, was expressly
made exclusive. But for its independent origin and late incorporation in the commerce clause, this would seem well nigh conclusive
of the exclusiveness of all the powers given by that clause. As it
is, that much can not be claimed for it. But it does seem proper
that its presence and form should at least be weighed with all
the other evidence tending to settle the character of the commerce power as exclusive or concurrent.
Again, it is hard to understand why there should have been
quite such strenuous opposition to the proposal to require an extraordinary majority for commercial regulations, if the several
"commercial" states could in any event legislate as freely for their
protection as under the existing system. True, their representatives wished active encouragement for the shipping industry and
so would doubtless have opposed the amendment even had they
thought it left them in status quo. They did not think this, however. Instead they believed its effect would be to strip them of
what weapons they had without supplying an adequate substitute,
as witness Clymer's prediction that "the northern and middle
states [would] be ruined, if not enabled to defend themselves
against foreign regulations,"274 and Gorham's protest that, should
the amendment carry, the Eastern states in joining the union
would "thereby tie their own hands from measures which they
could otherwise take for themselves."2 7r Here again would seem

to be collateral support for the conclusion that the intention was
to withdraw the regulation of commerce from state cognizance
altogether.
On the whole, the evidence supports the view that, as to the
restricted field which was deemed at the time to constitute regulation of commerce, the grant of power to the federal government
presupposed the withdrawal of authority pari passu from the
states. Against this conclusion there stand the general explana2742
2752

Farrand (Madison) 450.

Farrand (Madison) 453.
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tions as to concurrency in other connections and statements of
somewhat uncertain weight and relevancy by two delegates, at
least arguably presupposing a measure of concurrent power as to
commercial regulation. In support of it are a considerable number of instances early in the convention stressing the dichotomy
of state and federal power, a smaller number of statements of like
tenor after the convention adjourned, a few clear declarations
favoring the exclusive interpretation of the commerce clause specifically, as well as other utterances which stressed its completeness or the incapacity of the states to act in this area; the nature
and form of the grant of power over the Indian trade; and the
sentiments expressed in opposing the proposal to require extraordinary majorities for regulations of commerce.
While in its content the commerce clause was designed to include only a limited number of matters, the states could no more
legislate with propriety as to any subjects falling within its limits
than Congress could as to subjects falling outside them. Customs
regulation, maritime regulations, and the conduct of the more awesome types of mercantile enterprise, in other words, was the private preserve of Congress on which the states might not presume
to poach.

